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[1101] 
Roger Traynor, the Legal Process School, and 
Enterprise Liability  
EDMUND URSIN† 
Roger Traynor, who served on the California Supreme Court from 1940 to 1970, the last five 
years as Chief Justice, was one of America’s great judges. This Article compares Traynor’s view 
of the lawmaking role of courts with the dominant jurisprudential perspective of mainstream legal 
scholars at time, that of the legal process school.   
Today it is widely believed that Traynor was a “firm advocate of the legal process” approach to 
judicial lawmaking. The thesis of this Article, however, is that Traynor was a legal realist whose 
jurisprudence of what Judge Richard Posner has termed legal pragmatism was at odds with the 
legal process approach. In particular, Traynor’s 1960s rewriting of tort law to expand avenues 
for victim compensation, hailed as a “renaissance in the common law” by the editors of the 
Harvard Law Review, had been opposed by the legal process scholars who insisted that judges 
base their decisions on “neutral principles.” To Traynor, however, “neutral principles” were 
nothing more than meaningless “magic words” and an impediment to needed reform of the 
common law and, in particular, judicial adoption of what is now known as the theory of enterprise 
liability. 
I have previously written about this subject in How Great Judges Think: Judges Richard Posner, 
Henry Friendly, and Roger Traynor on Judicial Lawmaking. The present Article sharpens the 
diffuse sketch in that piece by focusing solely on Traynor and on the two articles he considered 
his most important. The first, the 1956 Law and Social Change in a Democratic Society, appeared 
two years after the Supreme Court’s 1954 decision in Brown v. Board of Education and defended 
judicial lawmaking against legal formalists who denied that judges are lawmakers. The second, 
the 1961 No Magic Words Can Do It Justice, directly targeted iconic 1959 articles by legal 
process scholars Henry Hart and Herbert Wechsler. The Hart and Wechsler articles had 
criticized the lawmaking of the Warren Court, including the Court’s landmark decision in Brown 
v. Board of Education, for its failure to conform to their demand for neutral principles. In 
response, Traynor wrote, “What did Professor Wechsler have in mind beyond “magic words,” 
comparing Wechsler to “desperate . . . students at examination time who search for “magic 
words” among mounting stacks . . . .” 
In his 2016 book, Divergent Paths, Judge Posner writes that my Buffalo piece presents an 
“accurate genealogy of legal realism” and legal pragmatism from the mid-nineteenth century to 
the present day. The present Article presents, for the first time, a genealogy of the common law 
aspect of legal process jurisprudence throughout the twentieth century, from Roscoe Pound, 
 
 †  Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law. Thanks to Judge Richard Posner for 
valuable comments on this and my previous articles on judicial lawmaking and to Roy Brooks and Kevin Cole 
for always helpful comments on previous articles on which I expand in this Article. I am extremely grateful to 
the many students who have provided valuable research assistance over a number of years. 
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through Justice Louis Brandeis, James Landis, and (later Justice) Felix Frankfurter, to Hart and 
Wechsler. Legal process scholarship is seen today to have been a public law jurisprudence, 
concerned with subjects such as the procedures for lawmaking by administrative agencies. My 
genealogy explains, however, that it was also a common law jurisprudence. And it was this 
jurisprudence that stood as an obstacle to courts adopting the enterprise liability agenda. 
The Article closes by demonstrating the successes of legal pragmatism in the courts both through 
the example of judicial adoption of the comparative rule and by an analysis of the torts decisions 
of both the liberal (1960–1986) and conservative (1986–2018) iterations of the California 
Supreme Court—and offers in a Postscript, a preview of the jurisprudence of the post-2019 seven 
member court that now consists of four justices appointed by Democratic Governor Jerry Brown. 
  
URSIN-71.4.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/10/20  3:43 PM 
May 2020] ROGER TRAYNOR 1103 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 1104 
I.      ENTERPRISE LIABILITY AND LEGAL PRAGMATISM .............................. 1111 
A. FROM GREEN AND LLEWELLYN TO TRAYNOR AND JAMES ....... 1111 
B. ENTERPRISE LIABILITY AND LEGAL FORMALISM ...................... 1113 
II.     LEGAL PROCESS JURISPRUDENCE AND ENTERPRISE LIABILITY .......... 1116 
A. LEGAL PROCESS JURISPRUDENCE AND THE COMMON LAW ...... 1116 
B. EARLY INCARNATIONS OF LEGAL PROCESS JURISPRUDENCE ... 1118 
1. Roscoe Pound ...................................................................... 1118 
2. From Brandeis, Frankfurter, and Landis, to Hart and  
 Sacks .................................................................................... 1120 
C. LEGAL PROCESS JURISPRUDENCE AND ENTERPRISE  
 LIABILITY ................................................................................... 1125 
III.    JUSTICE ROGER TRAYNOR, ENTERPRISE LIABILITY, AND LEGAL  
  PROCESS JURISPRUDENCE ................................................................. 1130 
A. JUSTICE ROGER TRAYNOR AND ENTERPRISE LIABILITY ........... 1130 
B. JUSTICE TRAYNOR’S LEGAL PRAGMATISM ............................... 1132 
C. JUSTICE TRAYNOR’S REJECTION OF THE “MAGIC WORDS” OF 
LEGAL PROCESS JURISPRUDENCE .............................................. 1137 
IV.    ENTERPRISE LIABILITY AND LEGAL PRAGMATISM IN THE  
  CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT .......................................................... 1143 
A. ALTERED NORMS OF JUDICIAL LAWMAKING ............................ 1143 
B. THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT: THE LIBERAL ERA  
 (1960–1985) .............................................................................. 1146 
C. THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT: THE CONSERVATIVE ERA 
(1986–2019) .............................................................................. 1148 
POSTSCRIPT ................................................................................................... 1150 
  
URSIN-71.4.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/10/20  3:43 PM 
1104 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 71:1101 
INTRODUCTION 
Roger Traynor, who served on the California Supreme Court from 1940 to 
1970—the last five years as Chief Justice—was one of America’s great judges.1 
It was under his guidance that the California Supreme Court became the most 
innovative and influential state supreme court in the nation.2 Judge Richard 
Posner has recently identified Traynor as “great,” one of only eleven judges in 
American history whom Posner listed as great.3 Similarly, in 1983, Judge Henry 
Friendly characterized Traynor as the “ablest judge of his generation,”4 writing 
that Traynor “modernized every field of law that he touched, and, in the course 
of his long judicial service, he touched almost all.”5 As the editors of the 
Harvard Law Review wrote upon his retirement in 1970, Traynor “inspired a 
dramatic renaissance of the common law.”6 Nowhere was that renaissance more 
conspicuous than in the Traynor court’s rewriting of the law of torts. 
Using tort law as an example, this Article will compare Traynor’s view of 
judicial lawmaking with the dominant jurisprudential view among mainstream 
legal scholars at the time, that of the legal process school of jurisprudence. In 
1958, The Legal Process, the set of teaching materials by Henry Hart and Albert 
Sacks, appeared as a “tentative edition” in mimeograph form.7 These materials 
dealt—as their subtitle suggests—with “The Making and Application of Law.”8 
The Legal Process was widely used in elite law schools across the nation in 
ensuing decades and lent its name to a school of jurisprudence that became 
dominant in the legal academy at the time.9 The Legal Process, and legal process 
scholarship generally, sought to articulate a uniquely judicial form of 
 
 1. Judge Henry Friendly ranked Traynor as one of the nine twentieth-century judges he regarded as great, 
indeed the only member of that august group who was of Friendly’s own generation. See DAVID M. DORSEN, 
HENRY FRIENDLY: GREATEST JUDGE OF HIS ERA 121–22 (2012).   
 2. See GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 91 (1974). As measured by decisions that have been 
“followed”—as used by Shepard’s Citation Service’s—the court has been the nation’s most followed state high 
court. See Jake Dear & Edward W. Jessen, “Followed Rates” and Leading State Cases, 1940–2005, 41 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 683, 710 (2007). Five of the six most followed decisions of the California decisions are tort 
decisions rendered since 1960. See id. at 708–09.   
 3. See RICHARD A. POSNER, DIVERGENT PATHS: THE ACADEMY AND THE JUDICIARY 88 (2016). 
 4. Henry J. Friendly, Ablest Judge of His Generation, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1039, 1039–40 (1983). 
 5. Id. at 1040. For example, in 1948, six years before Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), 
Traynor wrote the opinion for his court in Perez v. Sharp, 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948) (holding unconstitutional 
California’s anti-miscegenation legislation). This was two decades before the U.S. Supreme Court would follow 
suit in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 6. Editors’ Dedication, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1769 (1970). 
 7. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING 
AND APPLICATION OF LAW (Tentative ed. 1958). 
 8. Id. 
 9. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, An Historical and Critical Introduction to The Legal 
Process, in HENRY M. HART JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING 
AND APPLICATION OF LAW li, lii (William N. Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) [hereinafter Eskridge & 
Frickey, Historical Introduction]. In a 1994 Harvard Law Review article, Eskridge and Frickey write that The 
Legal Process “provided the agenda, much of the analytic structure, and the name of the ‘legal process school.’” 
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Commentary, The Making of The Legal Process, 107 HARV. L. 
REV. 2031, 2031 (1994). 
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lawmaking—and thus to limit the lawmaking role of courts. In this view, judges 
are lawmakers but, unlike legislators, they are constrained by the demand that 
they engage, for example, in a reasoned elaboration of neutral or durable 
principles.  
In the Historical Introduction to the 1994 formal publication (in unaltered 
form) of the materials, William Eskridge and Phillip Frickey write “that ‘The 
Legal Process expressed an approach to law that became deeply entrenched 
among legal scholars’ in the 1950s and for some time thereafter.”10 It 
represented the “encapsulation of attitudes and thoughts widely held by an entire 
generation of public and academic lawyers.”11 
In 1997, James McCall wrote that “Traynor . . . played [a] very significant 
role[] in establishing the propriety of process theory—serving . . . as [an] 
exemplar[] of the component ideas of process theory.”12 Similarly, the legal 
historian G. Edward White has expressed the widely shared belief that Traynor 
was a “firm advocate of the [legal] process theory,”13 which, if accurate, would 
add a significant datum to the claim that the legal process view was deeply 
entrenched in the thinking of a generation of legal thinkers.  
This Article will demonstrate, however, that Traynor was not a legal 
process advocate. Indeed, Traynor’s vision of his court rewriting tort law to meet 
new conditions and new moral values was in fundamental conflict with the 
 
 10. Eskridge & Frickey, Historical Introduction, supra note 9, at lii (quoting Jan Vetter, Postwar Legal 
Scholarship on Judicial Decision Making, 33 J. LEGAL ED. 412, 417 (1983)). 
 11. Id. at lxix. 
 12. James R. McCall, Thoughts About Roger Traynor and Learned Hand—A Qualifying Response to 
Professor Konefsky, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 1243, 1246 (1997). 
 13. G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION: PROFILES OF LEADING AMERICAN JUDGES 
245 (3d ed. 2007); see also BEN FIELD, ACTIVISM IN PURSUIT OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF 
CHIEF JUSTICE ROGER J. TRAYNOR xiv (2003) (“White . . . has written the most thorough analysis of Traynor’s 
judicial thought to date.”). John Poulos is something of an exception to the work previously cited in this footnote. 
In a 1995 article, he sought to align Traynor’s jurisprudence with that of the legal process scholars. For example, 
he wrote that Traynor relied on what Poulos saw as the legal process scholars’ “coherent-articulation-of reasons 
principle.” See John W. Poulos, The Judicial Philosophy of Roger Traynor, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1643, 1692 (1995). 
One problem with this is that it is unlikely that Traynor relied on legal process principles, rather than developing 
his own distinct jurisprudence. Leaving that aside, Poulos correctly notes in that article that Traynor rejected 
legal process bromides, such as the demand that courts base their lawmaking on the elaboration of neutral, or 
durable, principles. Id. at 1680–81. Each of the previously cited scholars, however, acknowledges tension 
between Traynor’s view that a basic aspect of judicial decision making involved making choices between 
conflicting social values or policies and legal process scholars’ emphasis on durable generalized rules. See FIELD, 
supra, at 122; WHITE, supra, at 296; Poulos, supra, at 1692. For example, despite characterizing Traynor as a 
“firm advocate of the process theory,” White wrote that Traynor “nonetheless saw its limitations as a vehicle for 
promoting the values of fairness and justice.” WHITE, supra, at 245. In White’s view, Traynor responded to these 
limitations by emphasizing “rationality [as] the essence of judging.” Id.; see also G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW 
IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 188, 208 (2003) (writing of Traynor’s “activist theory of judging” and 
the policy-making role he assigned to judges in tort cases, and characterizing Traynor as “in some respects, the 
state court equivalent of a ‘Warren Court’ judge”). James McCall has written that Judge Posner’s call “for a 
renewal of appreciation and study of the pragmatic perspective in judging . . . is tantamount to a request 
for . . . renewal of [legal] process theory.” McCall, supra note 12, at 1246 (footnote omitted). However, Posner, 
like Traynor, rejected the legal process perspective on judicial decision making. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, 
HOW JUDGES THINK 293–95 (2008).  
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jurisprudence of the legal process scholars. The tort theory that expressed those 
new conditions and new moral values is known today as the theory of enterprise 
liability. With his prophetic 1944 concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola 
Bottling Co.,14 Traynor himself was an early pioneer in the enterprise liability 
project, proposing that courts adopt a doctrine of strict liability for defective 
products. Roughly speaking, enterprise liability scholars sought the expansion 
of avenues for victims of accidental injury to receive compensation through the 
tort system. The goals were to widely distribute accident losses and to create 
incentives for business enterprises to reduce the accident toll associated with 
their activities.15  
Traynor and other enterprise liability scholars were legal realists whose 
jurisprudence of what Judge Richard Posner has termed “legal pragmatism” was 
at odds both with legal formalists who denied that judges make law and with 
legal process writers who sought to limit judicial lawmaking with formulas. In 
the view of the legal realists, judges are lawmakers with policy at the heart of 
their lawmaking. For Traynor, the problem was not undue judicial boldness but 
excessive judicial timidity.  
I have previously written about this subject in How Great Judges Think: 
Judges Richard Posner, Henry Friendly, and Roger Traynor on Judicial 
Lawmaking.16 The present Article sharpens the diffuse sketch in that piece by 
focusing solely on Traynor and on the two articles written by Traynor that were 
responsive to two of the most important jurisprudential events of his time. The 
first article, the 1956 Law and Social Change in a Democratic Society, appeared 
two years after the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education,17 
and defended judicial lawmaking against legal formalists who denied that judges 
are lawmakers.18 The second, the 1961 No Magic Words Can Do It Justice, 
directly targeted iconic 1959 articles by legal process scholars Henry Hart and 
Herbert Wechsler.19 Hart’s The Time Chart of the Justices and Wechsler’s 
Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law articles had criticized the 
lawmaking of the Warren Court, including the Court’s landmark decision in 
Brown v. Board of Education, for its failure to conform to their demand for 
neutral principles.20 In response, Traynor asked, “What did Professor Wechsler 
have in mind beyond magic words[,]” comparing Wechsler to 
 
 14. 150 P.2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring). 
 15. See id. (Traynor, J., concurring). 
 16. Edmund Ursin, How Great Judges Think: Judges Richard Posner, Henry Friendly, and Roger Traynor 
on Judicial Lawmaking, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 1267 (2009). 
 17. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 18. Roger J. Traynor, Law and Social Change in a Democratic Society, 1956 U. ILL. L.F. 230, 240.  
 19. Roger J. Traynor, No Magic Words Could Do It Justice, 49 CALIF. L. REV. 615, 623–24 (1961); see 
Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959); see also Henry 
M. Hart, Jr., The Supreme Court 1958 Term—Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84 
(1959). 
 20. Hart, supra note 19, at 163–64; Wechsler, supra note 19, at 22–23. 
URSIN-71.4.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/10/20  3:43 PM 
May 2020] ROGER TRAYNOR 1107 
“desperate . . . students at examination time who search for [magic words] in 
anguish among mounting stacks . . . .”21 
In his 2016 book, Divergent Paths, Judge Posner writes that my Great 
Judges piece presents an “accurate genealogy of [legal] realism” and legal 
pragmatism from the mid-nineteenth century to the present day.22 The present 
Article offers, for the first time, a genealogy of the common law aspect of legal 
process jurisprudence throughout the twentieth century, from Roscoe Pound, 
through Justice Louis Brandeis, James Landis, and (later Justice) Felix 
Frankfurter, to Hart and Wechsler. Today we are likely to see legal process 
scholarship as an influential body of public law jurisprudence, concerned with 
subjects such as constitutional restraints on the state, the interpretation of 
statutes, and the procedures for lawmaking by administrative agencies.23 My 
genealogy explains, however, that it was also a common law jurisprudence. 
Indeed, Hart and Sacks devote more attention to “Courts and the Common Law” 
(307 pages) than they do to “Statutory Interpretation” (271 pages). And it was 
this common law jurisprudence that stood as an obstacle to courts adopting the 
enterprise liability agenda. 
This Article explains the relationship between the enterprise liability theory 
and its jurisprudence of legal pragmatism on the one hand, and legal process 
jurisprudence on the other by tracing the evolution of these lines of scholarship 
from the turn of the twentieth century. The Article proceeds as follows. In Part 
I, we see that the enactment of workers’ compensation legislation in the early 
decades of the twentieth century served as an inspiration for enterprise liability 
scholars, from Leon Green and Kart Llewellyn in the 1920s and 1930s, to 
Traynor and Fleming James in the 1940s and 1950s. These writers urged courts 
to adopt their agenda of assuring accident victims adequate, but not undue, 
compensation.24 This, of course, was an affront to traditional (fault-based) tort 
theorists and legal formalists who held that courts apply but do not make law. 
Not surprisingly, therefore, a critic at the time objected that enterprise liability 
scholars were inviting courts to step beyond their appropriate role and “to 
remake the law themselves.”25 Enterprise liability scholars, however, simply 
ignored such protests. Aside from Llewellyn’s idiosyncratic foray into 
jurisprudence,26 they were generally content with the knowledge that courts are, 
and throughout American history have been, lawmakers. In their view, that was 
 
 21. Traynor, supra note 19, at 623–24. 
 22. POSNER, supra note 3, at 88 n.14. 
 23. See Eskridge & Frickey, Historical Introduction, supra note 9, at liii n.3. 
 24. See Edmund Ursin, Holmes, Cardozo, and the Legal Realists: Early Incarnations of Legal Pragmatism 
and Enterprise Liability, 50 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 537, 538–39 (2013). See generally VIRGINIA E. NOLAN & 
EDMUND URSIN, UNDERSTANDING ENTERPRISE LIABILITY: RETHINKING TORT REFORM FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY 32 (1995). 
 25. Luke K. Cooperrider, A Comment on the Law of Torts, 56 MICH. L. REV. 1291, 1299 (1958). 
 26. See, e.g., Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence—The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431 (1930). 
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the way it was and should be, and no fancy jurisprudential justification was 
needed.27 
Part II then recounts the development of legal process jurisprudence over 
the same period. From its earlier incarnations, the common law jurisprudence of 
legal process writers stood in tension with the substantive and jurisprudential 
views of the enterprise liability scholars. This tension, however, went largely 
unnoticed through the mid-1950s, as these lines of scholarship focused on 
different areas of substantive law and proceeded along parallel paths. In 
retrospect, however, the tension is apparent. Unlike enterprise liability scholars 
who looked to courts as sources of reform, legal process writers focused on the 
perceived inadequacies of courts as lawmakers as they developed a public law 
jurisprudence that sought to justify key elements of the emerging administrative 
state. A constant theme of these writers was the lack of lawmaking competence 
and political accountability of courts—and thus the need to limit the lawmaking 
role of courts in favor of lawmaking by legislatures and administrative bodies.28 
This perspective is treated by Eskridge and Frickey simply as a predicate for 
lawmaking by these bodies. Although not identified as such, when applied to 
common law subject matter it represents the common law jurisprudence of the 
legal process school. And it is this jurisprudence that would stand as an obstacle 
to courts modernizing tort law in the same manner that legislatures and 
administrative agencies would for public law. 
In the mid-1950s, Fowler Harper and Fleming James’s The Law of Torts, 
the most comprehensive treatment of the enterprise liability theory, and Hart and 
Sacks’s The Legal Process appeared within two years of each other in 1956 and 
1958, respectively. Then, in 1959, Wechsler’s Neutral Principles and Hart’s 
Time Chart of the Justices articles appeared.29 Although neither of these articles 
dealt with the common law, their general approach to judicial lawmaking would 
prove influential as writers focused on lawmaking in the common law. Taking 
their cue from the Wechsler and Hart articles—and, importantly, the Hart and 
Sacks materials—legal process scholars demanded, for example, that courts 
rendering common law decisions refrain from lawmaking that could be 
considered “political,”30 or lacking in “neutrality.”31 
These constraints were in fundamental conflict with the invitation of the 
Harper and James treatise for courts to remake the law of torts to attain “the 
benefits and values of social insurance.”32 Indeed, Robert Keeton, a leading legal 
process and torts scholar at the time, wrote that the legal process constraints 
 
 27. See Ursin, supra note 24, at 538–39; see also NOLAN & URSIN, supra note 24, at 32. 
 28. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 9, at lxi–lxii. 
 29. See Wechsler, supra note 19; Hart, supra note 19. 
 30. ROBERT E. KEETON, VENTURING TO DO JUSTICE: REFORMING PRIVATE LAW 94 (1969). 
 31. Henry H. Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on 
Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 238 (1973). 
 32. Fleming James, Jr., Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance, 57 YALE L.J. 
549, 552 (1948); Fleming James, Jr. & John J. Dickinson, Accident Proneness and Accident Law, 63 HARV. L. 
REV. 769, 782–94 (1950). 
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offered “some reassurance against the specter of runaway social engineering 
with ill-considered emphasis on risk-spreading capacity.”33 Keeton feared that 
courts would follow the siren song of James to rewrite tort law in the image of 
the enterprise liability theory. 
But that was precisely what Justice Traynor had in mind for his court. In 
Part III, therefore, I examine the relationship of Traynor and the enterprise 
liability theory to legal process scholarship. I explain that Traynor—like 
James—saw his Escola proposal for strict products liability as part of a broader 
“enterprise liability or social insurance.”34 And a goal of his extrajudicial 
writings was to persuade his court to write that agenda into tort law. To do this, 
however, he would have to overcome jurisprudential objections, first of legal 
formalists who, no doubt, counted among their ranks the great majority of rank 
and file lawyers and judges, and then of the increasingly influential legal process 
scholars. In an aptly titled 1956 article, Law and Social Change in a Democratic 
Society, Traynor took on the formalists and staked out the view that it is the task 
of courts to “hammer out new rules that will . . . anticipate what contemporary 
values will best meet [the] tests [of reason and experience].”35 At that time, 
Traynor was, in all likelihood, unaware of the developing legal process 
scholarship, most of which had appeared in teaching materials as opposed to 
widely accessible articles or books. 
This changed, however, with the 1959 publication of the Hart and Wechsler 
articles, which took the Warren Court to task for its failure to base its decisions 
on “neutral”36 or “impersonal and durable principles.”37 Traynor’s rebuttal came 
quickly with his 1961 No Magic Words Can Do It Justice,38 which was scornful 
of the unhelpful “academic tintinnabulation of enduring principles.”39 
In Part IV, we find that, at the date Traynor wrote, a mix of legal formalism 
and legal process concerns over the lack of competence and political 
accountability of courts still exerted its hold on many lawyers and judges. 
Attitudes toward the possibility that courts might adopt a doctrine of 
comparative negligence illustrate the firm grip that such thinking had in 
mainstream legal thought well into the 1960s. As late as 1968, for example, 
courts had uniformly refused to replace the contributory negligence doctrine 
with a rule of comparative negligence, not because they preferred the former, 
but because, as the Illinois Supreme Court concluded in 1968, “such a far-
reaching change, if desirable, should be made by the legislature rather than by 
the court.”40 
 
 33. Robert E. Keeton, Conditional Fault in the Law of Torts, 72 HARV. L. REV. 401, 444 (1959). 
 34. See Roger J. Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. 
REV. 363, 376 (1965). 
 35. Traynor, supra note 18, at 232. 
 36. Wechsler, supra note 19, at 19. 
 37. Hart, supra note 19, at 99. 
 38. See Traynor, supra note 19, at 627. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Maki v. Frelk, 239 N.E.2d 445, 447 (1968). 
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No doubt this posture accurately reflected the blend of legal formalism and 
legal process concerns that dominated the first six decades of the twentieth 
century. Beginning in the early 1960s, however, the California Supreme Court 
left legal formalism and legal process jurisprudence in the dust as it embraced 
the jurisprudence of legal pragmatism and the agenda of the enterprise liability 
scholars—and other state supreme courts soon followed suit. In fact, in 1973, 
the Florida Supreme Court adopted the comparative negligence rule,41 which 
was quickly followed by the California and Alaska supreme courts42—and then 
eventually by the Illinois Supreme Court itself.43 
The Article concludes by briefly surveying the tort lawmaking that resulted 
from the California Supreme Court’s embrace of legal pragmatism. From the 
1960s to the mid-1980s, that court consisted of a majority of justices appointed 
by Democratic governors. It was an ideologically liberal court that wrote large 
swaths of the enterprise liability agenda into law, adopting both the doctrine of 
strict products liability and expansive negligence doctrines. Then, in 1986, when 
three justices were voted out of office by the electorate, the court became a 
conservative court with a majority of justices appointed by Republican 
governors. Yet, the jurisprudence of this court remained the same as its 
predecessor. It was an avowedly lawmaking court, with (this time conservative) 
policies at the heart of its lawmaking. This court refined or cut back on—but in 
most cases did not abandon44—the enterprise liability doctrines put in place by 
its predecessor, while at times adopting new policy-based doctrines limiting 
defendant liability.45  
In a postscript, I note that Governor Jerry Brown took office in 2011 and 
served until 2019.46 Brown, a Democrat, appointed four members to the seven-
member court. Early signs indicate that this court will embrace legal 
pragmatism. If so, legal pragmatism will have been the jurisprudence of the 
California Supreme Court for more than six decades while the common law 
jurisprudence of the legal process school has largely dropped from sight. 
 
 41. Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So.2d 431, 438 (Fla. 1973). 
 42. See Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037, 1049 (Alaska 1975); Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226, 1242 
(Cal. 1975). 
 43. See Alvis v. Ribar, 421 N.E.2d 886, 897 (Ill. 1981). 
 44. But see Peterson v. Superior Court, 899 P.2d 905, 906 (Cal. 1995) (overruling strict landlord liability 
rule previously adopted in Becker v. IRM Corp., 698 P.2d 116, 122 (Cal. 1985)). 
 45. See, e.g., Ann M. v. Pac. Plaza Shopping Ctr., 863 P.2d 207, 215–16 (Cal. 1993) (limiting the duty of 
business premises owner to protect persons against violent third-party crime); Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 
712 (Cal. 1992) (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting) (abolishing traditional consent-based defense of 
assumption of risk and establishing a new no-duty rule for co-participants in recreational sports); Thing v. La 
Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 815 (Cal. 1989) (restricting recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress). 
 46. See infra text accompanying notes 399–419. 
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I.  ENTERPRISE LIABILITY AND LEGAL PRAGMATISM 
A. FROM GREEN AND LLEWELLYN TO TRAYNOR AND JAMES 
The enactment of workers’ compensation legislation in the early decades 
of the twentieth century marked a seminal moment in American personal injury 
law, indicating that nineteenth century restrictions on tort liability were out of 
touch with the conditions and values of twentieth-century America. In the late 
1920s and early 1930s, the visionary legal realists Leon Green and Karl 
Llewellyn responded to the challenge posed by this situation and, in doing so, 
laid the foundations for the enterprise liability doctrines that courts would adopt 
decades later.47 
At the time that Green and Llewellyn wrote, formalism—the view that 
judges apply but do not make law, and that policy has no role in judicial decision 
making—was the norm in judicial decisions and mainstream legal thought.48 In 
the field of torts, formalism was linked to what might be called “traditional tort 
theory.” Traditional tort scholars wrote of “the fundamental proposition of the 
common law which link[ed] liability to fault.”49 
In Green’s view, however, fault, the cornerstone of traditional tort theory, 
“had become bankrupt.”50 In its place, Green offered policy, or “dut[y],” factors 
to determine common law duty and liability rules—and whether legislatively 
enacted compensation plans modeled after workers’ compensation plans should 
displace tort in discrete categories of accidents.51 Perhaps most provocative was 
Green’s suggestion that loss spreading capacity should be a legitimate factor in 
fashioning liability rules, which he linked to the proposal that courts single out 
industrial premises cases for special consideration, including the possibility of 
replacing the no-duty rules that protected landowners from liability with a full 
duty of care.52 
For his part, Llewellyn proposed something more radical—that courts 
bring into tort law an emerging area of strict liability that could be found in his 
area of expertise, the law of sales. Llewellyn saw the law of sales and, in 
particular, the implied warranty of quality that attaches to the sale of goods as a 
source for courts to use in developing a doctrine of strict products liability.53 The 
“needed protection,” Llewellyn wrote, “is twofold: to shift the immediate 
 
 47. For a detailed depiction of the legal realists/enterprise liability scholars, see NOLAN & URSIN, supra 
note 24, at 30–37, 71–81, 88–99; see also Ursin, supra note 24, at 538.  
 48. See Warren A. Seavey, Tribute, Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law of Torts, 52 HARV. L. REV. 372, 372; 
48 YALE L.J. 390, 390; 39 COLUM. L. REV. 20, 20 (1939) [hereinafter cited to HARVARD LAW REVIEW]. 
 49. Id. at 375 (noting that the policy of not imposing liability for non-negligent conduct). Ezra Ripley 
Thayer, Liability Without Fault, 29 HARV. L. REV. 801, 815 (1916). 
 50. Leon Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases: II, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 255, 270 (1929). 
 51. Id. at 255–57. 
 52. Id. at 273–75. 
 53. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF SALES 341–42 (1930) [hereinafter 
LLEWELLYN, CASES AND MATERIALS]; Karl N. Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality, and Society, 36 COLUM. L. 
REV. 699, 704–05 n.14 (1936) [hereinafter Llewellyn, Warranty of Quality]. 
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incidence of the hazard of life in an industrial society away from the individual 
over to a group which can distribute the loss; and to place the loss where the 
most pressure will be exerted to keep down future losses.”54 
Llewellyn wrote that courts, by “fudging [their] logic,”55 had begun to 
impose strict liability in food cases. However, Llewellyn did not see this 
development as “confined to [the food cases] . . . . It spreads to cover other 
hazards to consumers.”56 And Llewellyn’s “ideal picture” of a broad strict 
liability doctrine indicated “a set of tendencies toward . . . which [the cases 
were] . . . driving.”57 
The jurisprudential view of Green and Llewellyn was simple and clear: in 
the common law realm, courts (1) do make law—they legislate¾and (2) such 
lawmaking is so clearly desirable, necessary, and embedded in our common law 
tradition that it needs no complex jurisprudential justification—beyond, that is, 
arguments as to the substantive desirability of particular proposals. Today, we 
would identify this jurisprudential view, which traces to the teachings of Holmes 
and Cardozo,58 as what Judge Posner has termed legal pragmatism.59 And, 
indeed, Fowler Harper, a contemporary of Green and Llewellyn, coined the term 
“juristic pragmatism” in 1929 to describe Green’s (and Holmes’s) 
jurisprudence.60 
By the 1940s, Green and Llewellyn had been followed by a second 
generation of scholars who elaborated on themes they had initiated. Foremost 
among this second generation were Fleming James and Justice Roger Traynor, 
who had been appointed to the California Supreme Court in 1940. We have 
already encountered Justice Traynor’s seminal 1944 proposal for strict products 
liability. James, Traynor’s academic counterpart, carried forth the enterprise 
liability agenda with a series of articles in the 1940s and 1950s which became 
the volume on accidental injury of The Law of Torts, the treatise James co-
authored with Fowler Harper.61 While endorsing the doctrine of strict products 
liability, the main thrust of James’s work was an “assault on the citadel of 
fault,”62 developing the implications of the enterprise liability theory “for the 
administration of the fault principle.”63 Thus, James sought to attain the 
“benefits and values of social insurance . . . under [the] present system.”64 In 
doing this, James applied the techniques suggested by Green in the 1920s and 
 
 54. LLEWELLYN, CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 53, at 341.  
 55. Llewellyn, Warranty of Quality, supra note 53, at 704–05 n.14. 
 56. LLEWELLYN, CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 53, at 342. 
 57. Id. 
 58. See Ursin, supra note 24, at 583. 
 59. Judge Posner writes that “judges in our system are legislators as well as adjudicators” and policy plays 
an important role in their lawmaking. POSNER, supra note 13, at 118. 
 60. See Fowler Vincent Harper, Some Implications of Juristic Pragmatism, 39 INT’L J. ETHICS 269, 273 
(1929). 
 61. 2 FOWLER V. HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF TORTS 742–44 (1956). 
 62. Fleming James, Jr., Accident Liability: Some Wartime Developments, 55 YALE L.J. 365, 374 (1946). 
 63. James, Jr. & Dickinson, supra note 32, at 782. 
 64. James, Jr., supra note 32, at 552; James, Jr. & Dickinson, supra note 32, at 782–94. 
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1930s to approve of doctrines and interpretations of doctrines that expanded 
negligence liability and to urge the limitation of doctrines that restricted it.65 
Consistent with the compensation plan model, James linked this call for the 
expansion of liability with the elimination or limitation of damages for pain and 
suffering.66  
Upon its publication in 1956, the Harper and James treatise stood beside 
William Prosser’s hornbook as the source judges and lawyers would look to in 
researching the law. As a critic noted, however, the treatise examined “[e]very 
legal principle and the result of every case . . . through one lens”—which was, 
of course, the enterprise liability perspective.67 This critic wrote that the treatise 
treated  
any “no duty rule” not based upon the scope of foreseeable danger, and any 
“rule of thumb” which subtracts from the jury’s power to determine the 
“reasonableness” of the parties’ conduct . . . [as] aberrational in terms of the 
aesthetic principle and therefore to be decried by all right thinking jurists.68  
The critic feared that the treatise was an invitation for courts “to remake the law 
themselves”69—which, of course, it was. 
B. ENTERPRISE LIABILITY AND LEGAL FORMALISM 
The legal pragmatism embraced by enterprise liability scholars would 
become the jurisprudence of the California Supreme Court beginning in the 
1960s. It was also the view of Justice Roger Traynor, the leader of that court. 
But it is important to recognize that legal formalism remained the dominant 
“mainstream” outlook in American law well into the 1950s, and in tort law, this 
meant that the legal realist/enterprise liability agenda could be rejected or 
ignored. A prominent example of this phenomenon is provided by the 
 
 65. See James, Jr., supra note 62, at 371–74; James, Jr., supra note 32, at 553, 554, 556; Fleming James, 
Jr., Assumption of Risk, 61 YALE L.J. 141, 141 (1952); Fleming James, Jr., Functions of Judge and Jury in 
Negligence Cases, 58 YALE L.J. 667, 686–87 (1949); Fleming James Jr. & Roger F. Perry, Legal Cause, 60 
YALE L.J. 761, 761–62 (1951); Fleming James, Jr., Proof of the Breach in Negligence Cases (Including Res Ipsa 
Loquitur), 37 VA. L. REV. 179, 198–99 (1951); Fleming James, Jr., Scope of Duty in Negligence Cases, 47 NW. 
U. L. REV. 778, 778 (1953); Fleming James, Jr., Statutory Standards and Negligence in Accident Cases, 11 LA. 
L. REV. 95, 95 (1950); Fleming James, Jr., The Qualities of the Reasonable Man in Negligence Cases, 16 MO. 
L. REV. 1, 1 (1951); Fleming James, Jr., Tort Liability of Occupiers of Land: Duties Owed to Trespassers, 63 
YALE L.J. 144, 146 (1953). For example, decisions that expansively interpreted the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur 
were praised as “outstanding” demonstrations of “real judicial statesmanship.” James, Jr., supra note 62, at 392. 
In contrast, there was “a sound basis both in reason and on authority for treating contributory negligence as a 
disfavored defense in a system wherein liability for negligence is ever expanding.” James, Jr. & Dickinson, 
supra note 32, at 789. And James reported in 1946 that liability had been expanding. Specifically, the “system 
of liability based on fault [was] being modified by the courts so as constantly to extend the bases of recovery for 
accident victims.” James, Jr., supra note 62, at 400. 
 66. Fleming James, Jr., Damages in Accident Cases, 41 CORNELL L. REV. 582, 584 (1956). 
 67. Cooperrider, supra note 25, at 1299. 
 68. Id. at 1309. 
 69. Id. at 1299. 
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scholarship of Warren Seavey, the leading torts scholar at Harvard Law School 
and Reporter for the Restatement of Torts.70 
Seavey’s writings on torts had appeared over the decades in the Harvard 
Law Review and represented six of the fifteen articles in the Review’s 1967 
edition of Essays on the Law of Torts.71 Seavey’s 1939 article, Mr. Justice 
Cardozo and the Law of Torts, was published simultaneously in the Harvard 
Law Review, the Columbia Law Review, and the Yale Law Journal as part of a 
tribute to Justice Cardozo,72 who had died in 1937. Seavey’s discussion of the 
lawmaking role of courts reflects Seavey’s view, ignoring Cardozo’s 
extrajudicial writings.73 Seavey wrote that Cardozo’s “power lay in his ability to 
see the plan and pattern underlying the law and to make clear the paths which 
had been obscured by the undergrowth of illogical reasoning.”74  
According to Seavey, Cardozo “did not first decide from some internal and 
unexplainable sense of justice that one of the parties was entitled to the decision 
and then find or invent a formula to fit the facts.”75 Similarly, Cardozo did not 
“allow his private opinions of policy to sway him from the lines into which the 
law had been moulded.”76 Seavey was particularly disdainful of the policy of 
compensating victims of accidents and spreading of accident losses, writing that 
Cardozo “did not become the protector of the injured merely because the 
defendant had ample funds to meet a judgment or had an ability to spread the 
loss.”77 In this vein, Seavey wrote that Cardozo’s “scales were those of legal 
justice, not sentimental justice.”78 Thus, Cardozo “used principles deduced from 
 
 70. This discussion of Seavey is adapted from Edmund Ursin, Judicial Creativity and Tort Law, 49 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 229, 282–85 (1981). 
 71. See Warren A. Seavey, Principles of Torts, 56 HARV. L. REV. 72 (1964) [hereinafter Seavey, Principles 
of Torts]; Warren A. Seavey, Negligence¾Subjective or Objective?, 41 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1927); Warren A. 
Seavey, Nuisance: Contributory Negligence and Other Mysteries, 65 HARV. L. REV. 984 (1952); Warren A. 
Seavey, Reliance Upon Gratuitous Promises or Other Conduct, 64 HARV. L. REV. 913 (1951); Warren A. 
Seavey, Comment, Res IPSA Loquitur: Tabula in Naufragio, 63 HARV. L. REV. 643 (1950); Warren A. Seavey, 
Swift & Co. v. Shuster¾Liability to One Aware of Danger, 65 HARV. L. REV. 623 (1952). 
 72. Seavey, supra note 48, at 372. 
 73. See Ursin, supra note 24, at 562. In his classic 1921 book, The Nature of the Judicial Process, Cardozo 
flatly rejected the legal formalism that Seavey would later espouse—and attribute to him. See BENJAMIN N. 
CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 102 (1921). Echoing themes developed by Holmes, Cardozo 
wrote that “[i]t is the function of our courts . . . to keep the doctrines up to date with the mores by continual 
restatement and by giving them a continually new content.” Id. at 135 (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Arthur L. Corbin, The Offer of an Act for a Promise, 29 YALE L.J. 767, 771 (1920)). Common law 
judges must innovate, “for with new conditions there must be new rules.” Id. at 137. Cardozo further opined that 
“[t]his means . . . that the juristic philosophy of the common law is at bottom the philosophy of pragmatism.” 
Id. at 102 (citing Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 609 (1908)). Nevertheless, 
it is also true that Cardozo cast opinions, such as MacPherson v. Buick, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916), which paved the 
way for the elimination of the privity requirement in tort actions against negligent manufacturers, in a formalistic 
style. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 42, 109 (1990). 
 74. Seavey, supra note 48, at 372. 
 75. Id. at 373. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id.  
URSIN-71.4.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/10/20  3:43 PM 
May 2020] ROGER TRAYNOR 1115 
the cases and weighed competing interests as had the judges who had gone 
before him.”79 To do otherwise, according to Seavey, would be to “destroy[] [his 
court] as a court of law.”80 
According to this restrictive view, tort law was synonymous with the 
negligence principle, which was accepted as a given from which subsidiary rules 
could be deduced. Seavey, for example, wrote that by the time Cardozo came to 
the bench in 1914, the “generalizations had already been made.”81 Specifically, 
“both in England and the United States there was recognition of the policy of 
making a negligent person liable for harm resulting from his activities and of not 
imposing liability for [non-negligent conduct].”82 The task of torts scholarship 
was to refine this system of liability based on fault—to articulate the “principles 
deduced from the cases.”83  
James and his fellow enterprise liability scholars no doubt simply 
dismissed views like Seavey’s as out of touch with the reality of judicial 
lawmaking as it was actually practiced in the courts. For them, there was no need 
to provide fancy justification for the legal pragmatism implicit in their writings. 
Moreover, James appeared optimistic about the prospects for the enterprise 
liability agenda in the courts, writing in 1946 that “[j]udicial modification [of 
tort law was] . . . likely to continue along the same lines and at about the same 
pace” as in the recent past.84 But others were not so confident. 
Charles Gregory, who in 1951 urged the adoption of strict liability rules by 
courts, saw courts “undermining the old fault principles, little by little.” 85 But, 
at the same time, he saw courts doing so in a hesitant manner, often not 
acknowledging openly what they were doing.86 In his view, the judiciary had to 
pick up its game. Indeed, he saw a need for a new type of judge suited to this 
task. And he had a role model in mind: Lemuel Shaw, Chief Judge of the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts from 1830 to 1860. Shaw was the 
author of Brown v. Kendall, the cornerstone of the negligence system,87 and 
Farwell v. Boston & Worcester Railroad, which adopted the fellow servant rule 
 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 374. 
 82. Id. at 375. Seavey reported that “Fletcher v. Rylands, with its tendency towards the creation of liability 
irrespective of negligence, had gained little headway in the United States.” Id. (footnote omitted). Decisions 
imposing strict (warranty) liability in food products cases were “predicated upon a failure to perform . . . [a] 
contractual duty,” and thus were irrelevant to tort analysis. Seavey, Principles of Torts, supra note 71, at 86. 
 83. Seavey, supra note 48, at 373. Seavey and other traditional theorists were uninterested in (and often 
hostile toward) proposals to supplant tort by compensation plans. When the initial apprehension over the 
enactment of workers’ compensation legislation subsided, this legislation was seen as irrelevant to tort analysis 
because it “create[d] an insurers’ rather than a tort liability.” Seavey, Principles of Torts, supra note 71, at 86. It 
followed, of course, that theorists could entirely omit proposals for automobile compensation plans in analyses 
whose goal was to explicate principles of torts. See id. 
 84. James, Jr., supra note 62, at 400. 
 85. Charles O. Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L. REV. 359, 396 (1951). 
 86. Id. See NOLAN & URSIN, supra note 24, at 95–96. 
 87. 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292, 295–98 (Mass. 1850). 
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and the defense of assumption of risk.88 Shaw’s creative lawmaking shaped the 
tort law and all of the common law of his era.89 It was because of this judicial 
lawmaking that Holmes praised Shaw as “the greatest magistrate which this 
country has produced.”90 
Gregory recognized that for the enterprise liability theory to prevail, a new 
generation of Shaw-like judges was needed to boldly accept the task of 
reforming tort law. Thus, Gregory called for judicial “statesmanship,”91 for  
men as able and clear-headed as Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw—men who have 
faith in their evaluation of the needs of the times, who know where they want 
to go and who have the talent for stating their convictions in clear and 
consistent principles which operate as beacon lights to guide the rest of the 
profession.92 
II.  LEGAL PROCESS JURISPRUDENCE AND ENTERPRISE LIABILITY  
A. LEGAL PROCESS JURISPRUDENCE AND THE COMMON LAW 
The problem with Gregory’s prescription was that merely calling for 
judicial statesmanship might not be enough. This was because, dating back to 
the early years of the twentieth century, a powerful body of scholarship had been 
developing alongside enterprise liability scholarship, warning against this very 
type of judicial lawmaking. And its most complete articulation came just two 
years following publication of the Harper and James treatise with the appearance 
of the legal process materials by Henry Hart and Albert Sacks in 1958. For Hart, 
Sacks, and their followers, Gregory’s judicial statesmanship would be an 
illegitimate exercise of raw judicial power. Shaw, an avowed practitioner of this 
style of judicial lawmaking, was a poster child for judicial lawmaking gone 
wrong. 
For many, it may come as a surprise to learn that Shaw would be held up 
as an example of impermissible judicial lawmaking. After all, one of his most 
notable accomplishments was to establish the legitimacy of the police power, 
and with it, the idea of judicial deference to legislative judgments.93 It may also 
surprise some to learn that legal process scholars would limit judicial lawmaking 
in common law subjects. 
Today, when we think of legal process jurisprudence, we are likely to think 
of it as an influential body of public law scholarship centered around Hart and 
Sacks’s classic book The Legal Process.94 William Eskridge and Phillip Frickey 
have ably traced the historical development of this jurisprudence from the turn 
of the twentieth century to The Legal Process, and then to the early 1990s, at 
 
 88. 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 49, 57–62 (Mass. 1842). 
 89. See LEONARD W. LEVY, THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF JUSTICE SHAW 13 (1957). 
 90. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 106 (1881). 
 91. Gregory, supra note 85, at 396. 
 92. Id. 
 93. LEVY, supra note 89, at 229. 
 94. HART & SACKS, supra note 7. 
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which time their historical introduction to this important work served as a 
preface to its formal publication.95 (It had appeared only as a mimeograph 
“Tentative Edition” in 1958.) 
Eskridge and Frickey write that the scholarship in the first four decades of 
the twentieth century laid the groundwork for post-war scholars to “set forth the 
basic intellectual framework from which law professors developed a public law 
curriculum.”96 By “public law” Eskridge and Frickey “mean the law pertaining 
to public administration, including constitutional constraints upon the state, the 
interpretation of statutes, the procedures for agency action, and the relationship 
of public institutions to one another and to the citizenry.”97 Between 1938 and 
1958, they write, “most of the ground-breaking work was accomplished in the 
form of teaching materials,”98 culminating in The Legal Process, “the classic 
exposition of the post-war consensus in public law.”99  
These materials, Eskridge and Frickey continue, represented the 
“encapsulation of attitudes and thoughts widely held by an entire generation of 
public and academic lawyers.”100 Indeed, they “expressed an approach to law 
that became deeply entrenched among legal scholars in the 1950s and for some 
time thereafter.”101 
According to Eskridge and Frickey, “[f]ew published law books have 
enjoyed [the] . . . widespread influence” of The Legal Process.102 These 
materials, however, did not touch upon issues of constitutional law. But a pair 
of articles published in 1959 by iconic legal process scholars Herbert Wechsler 
and Henry Hart, did.103 These articles, both critical of the jurisprudence (and 
“activism”) of the Warren Court, together with The Legal Process, represent the 
cornerstones of legal process jurisprudence. Eskridge and Frickey write that 
“[l]eading theories of statutory interpretation developed during the 1980s are 
lineal descendants of Hart and Sacks’[s] . . . theory.” Similarly, “the most 
sophisticated theories of judicial review are process theories in the Hart and 
Sacks tradition.”104  
But to think of legal process jurisprudence as public law jurisprudence is 
to miss a key feature of this scholarship; for it is also, importantly, a common 
law jurisprudence.105 As in the case of its well-known constitutional counterpart, 
legal process scholars demanded that courts refrain from lawmaking that could 
 
 95. Eskridge & Frickey, Historical Introduction, supra note 9, at li–lii. 
 96. Id. at lxviii. 
 97. Id. at liii n.3. 
 98. Id. at lxviii. 
 99. Id. at xcviii. 
 100. Id. at lxix. 
 101. Id. at lii (quoting Jan Vetter, supra note 10, at 417). 
 102. Id. 
 103. See Hart, supra note 19; Wechsler, supra note 19. 
 104. Eskridge & Frickey, Historical Introduction, supra note 9, at lii. 
 105. Hart and Sacks devote more attention to “Courts and the Common Law” (307 pages) than they do to 
“Statutory Interpretation” (270 pages). See HART & SACKS, supra note 7, at 341–647, 1111–1380. 
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be considered “political” or lacking in “neutrality.”106 And it is that 
jurisprudence which stood in opposition to the substantive and jurisprudential 
views of enterprise liability scholars. To understand this situation, it is useful to 
trace the development of legal process-type scholarship during the first five 
decades of the twentieth century before turning to the mature elaboration of what 
we now know as the scholarship of the legal process school.  
B. EARLY INCARNATIONS OF LEGAL PROCESS JURISPRUDENCE 
1. Roscoe Pound 
In his famous dissent in Lochner v. New York, Holmes took the Supreme 
Court to task for its willingness to overturn economic and social legislation.107 
In their call for judicial self-restraint, critics of the Lochner Court constantly 
drew upon Holmes’s position. A prominent early example is Roscoe Pound, who 
later served as dean of Harvard Law School for two decades. In 1908, Pound 
wrote of judges who purported to deduce results in cases from preexisting 
principles, which he called “mechanical jurisprudence.”108 The fatal flaw of this 
jurisprudence was that it ignored the social reality to which legal rules must be 
applied. In contrast, Pound called for a “sociological jurisprudence,”109 which 
he defined as “the movement for the adjustment of principles and doctrines to 
the human conditions they are to govern rather than to assumed first 
principles.”110  
Not surprisingly, Pound wrote that Holmes’s Lochner dissent was not only 
a source of his ideas, but also the best exposition of sociological jurisprudence 
in America.111 In response to the Supreme Court’s “nullification of the social 
policies to which more and more [of the public] . . . is compelled to be 
committed,”112 Pound, like Holmes, demanded that courts restrain themselves in 
their exercise of the power of judicial review. 
 
 106. See infra text accompanying notes 175–190. 
 107. 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 108. Ursin, supra note 70, at 268–69 (discussing Pound, supra note 73, at 605–07). Pound was a prolific 
writer whose work spanned half a century. For examples of his work bearing on the themes discussed in this 
Article, see generally Roscoe Pound, Do We Need a Philosophy of Law?, 5 COLUM. L. REV. 339 (1905); Roscoe 
Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12 (1910); Roscoe Pound, The Call for a Realist 
Jurisprudence, 44 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1931); Roscoe Pound, The Need of a Sociological Jurisprudence, 19 
GREEN BAG 607 (1907) [hereinafter Pound, Sociological Jurisprudence]; Roscoe Pound, The Theory of Judicial 
Decision, 36 HARV. L. REV. 641, 802, 940 (1923) [hereinafter Pound, Judicial Decision]; Roscoe Pound, The 
Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence, 24 HARV. L. REV. 591 (1911); Roscoe Pound, The Scope and 
Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence, 25 HARV. L. REV. 140 (1911). For a biography of Pound, see DAVID 
WIGDOR, ROSCOE POUND: PHILOSOPHER OF LAW (1974). See generally G. Edward White, From Sociological 
Jurisprudence to Realism: Jurisprudence and Social Change in Early Twentieth-Century America, 58 VA. L. 
REV. 999 (1972) (discussing movement from mechanical justice to sociological jurisprudence). 
 109. See Pound, Sociological Jurisprudence, supra note 108, at 609.  
 110. Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454, 464 (1909). 
 111. Id. 
 112. Roscoe Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383, 407 (1908). 
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What Lochner critics, such as Pound, overlooked, however, was that 
Holmes coupled his call for judicial self-restraint in constitutional adjudication 
with a call for policy-based lawmaking by courts in common law subjects. For 
Holmes, there was nothing anomalous in recognizing the role of policy in the 
common law, where the legislature can always undo the law the courts have 
made while calling for judicial self-restraint when the legislature has spoken. 
Indeed, in his famous 1897 essay, The Path of the Law, Holmes had chastised 
courts of that era for their lack of such lawmaking.  
Focusing on the law of worker accidents, Holmes first noted the 
“inclination of a very large part of the community . . . to make certain [well-
known businesses] . . . insure the safety of those with whom they deal.”113 Then, 
turning to the lawmaking role of the courts—and setting aside how he would 
decide the substantive issue if it were to be presented to him—Holmes suggested 
that courts might properly rewrite the pre-workers’ compensation tort law 
governing workplace accidents.114 Holmes wrote that “our theory upon this 
matter is open to reconsideration, although I am not prepared to say how I should 
decide if a reconsideration were proposed.”115 
Progressive critics of the Lochner Court, such as Pound, however, ignored 
or, at times, explicitly rejected the reform role Holmes urged for courts in the 
common law. In his 1908 article, Common Law and Legislation,116 for example, 
Pound wrote that “[a]s the development of law goes on, the function of the judge 
is confined within ever narrowing limits; the main source of modifications in 
legal relations comes to be more and more exclusively the legislature.”117 Pound 
stressed both competence and political accountability arguments for limiting the 
judicial role, much like what legal process scholars would do decades later. He 
wrote that “[c]ourts are less and less competent to formulate rules for new 
relations which require regulation. They have the experience of the past. But 
they do not have the facts of the present.”118 In this vein, Pound continued, “[w]e 
are told that law-making of the future will consist in putting the sanction of 
society on what has been worked out in the sociological laboratory. That courts 
cannot conduct such laboratories is self-evident.”119 Moreover, courts lack 
political accountability. Pound wrote that “legislation is the more truly 
democratic form of lawmaking. We see in legislation the more direct and 
accurate expression of the general will.”120 Thus, “[i]t is a sound instinct of the 
 
 113. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 466 (1897). 
 114. Id. at 467. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Ursin, supra note 70, at 279–80 (discussing Pound, supra note 112, at 407). 
 117. Pound, supra note 112, at 403 n.2 (quoting HENRY SIDGWICK, THE ELEMENTS OF POLITICS 203 (2d ed. 
1897)). 
 118. Id. at 403. 
 119. Id. at 406 (footnote omitted). 
 120. Id. at 406. 
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community that objects to the settlement of questions of the highest social import 
in private litigations between John Doe and Richard Roe.”121 
Pound gave up on the courts as a major lawmaking institution.122 As 
Eskridge and Frickey have noted, Pound’s writings supported the 
“position . . . that the role of courts in a democratic society should be the 
elaboration and application of statutory policy, rather than the naked creation of 
public policy in the common law.”123 
2. From Brandeis, Frankfurter, and Landis, to Hart and Sacks 
Pound’s pessimistic view of courts as lawmakers was shared during 
subsequent decades by scholars whose work can be seen as a precursor to the 
legal process scholarship of the 1950s. Looking back on this period, Louis Jaffe 
wrote, “When I was a student in the Harvard Law School in 1928 and 1931, I 
came to believe that the judiciary by its very nature was at the worst reactionary 
and at the least undependable.”124 The source of this belief, of course, was 
Lochner and its progeny. “This was a time when the courts were declaring social 
legislation unconstitutional, were stifling union organization by injunction, and 
more or less generally throwing their weight behind big business and finance.”125 
This was an era of extreme distrust of judicial power for Harvard Law School 
students and scholars. As Jaffe wrote, “Led by Frankfurter we were all 
passionate believers in the dogma of judicial restraint. Some of us indeed were 
sympathetic to the argument that John Marshall’s assertion in Marbury v. 
Madison of the power to declare legislation unconstitutional was 
‘usurpation.’”126  
When one examines thinking regarding the common law, one finds, as 
Pound’s scholarship suggested, a restrictive view of the lawmaking role of 
courts¾which thus conflicts with the views of Holmes, as well as the views of 
the legal realists Leon Green and Karl Llewellyn. In part, this restrictive view 
can be explained by the fact that the early and continuing focus of legal process 
thinking was the task of “justifying the key feature of the modern regulatory 
state—lawmaking by agencies.”127  
 
 121. Id. at 404. 
 122. Id. at 403 n.2; see Pound, supra note 73, at 622. Pound at times envisioned what appears to be a more 
creative role for the judiciary. See, e.g., Pound, Judicial Decision, supra note 108, at 802, 940. Nevertheless, the 
themes of limited judicial competence and accountability and the desire to restrict judicial lawmaking persisted 
in his writings throughout his life. See, e.g., ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 
102–03 (1954). 
 123. Eskridge & Frickey, Historical Introduction, supra note 9, at lviii. Although Hart and Sacks never 
formally published their legal process materials, the 1958 “Tentative Edition” became the standard version for 
more than thirty years and was preserved intact by the 1994 Eskridge & Frickey edition. 
 124. LOUIS L. JAFFE, ENGLISH AND AMERICAN JUDGES AS LAWMAKERS 85 (1969); see Ursin, supra note 16, 
at 1295; Ursin, supra note 70, at 281. 
 125. JAFFE, supra note 124, at 85. 
 126. JAFFE, supra note 124, at 86 (discussing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 151 (1803)). 
 127.  Eskridge & Frickey, Historical Introduction, supra note 9, at lxi. 
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Eskridge and Frickey trace the antecedents of legal process thinking during 
the early decades of the twentieth century through the work of Justice Louis 
Brandeis, (later Justice) Felix Frankfurter, and James Landis.128 In the work of 
these scholars and Justices, we see the “emerging concept of ‘institutional 
competence.’”129 Central to this concept was the idea that “each organ [of 
government] has a special competence or expertise, and the key to good 
government is not just figuring out what is the best policy, but figuring out which 
institutions should be making which decisions and how all the institutions should 
interrelate.” This line of thought posited “the futility of solving complex social 
problems through case-by-case adjudication by isolated judges” and argued that 
“such problems are better left to the legislative and administrative process.”130 
The contrast between the institutional competence viewpoint and that of 
Holmes can be seen in International News Services v. The Associated Press,131 
a 1918 Supreme Court decision presented in the Hart and Sacks materials,132 and 
discussed by Eskridge and Frickey.133 In a formalistic opinion analogizing news 
stories generated by the Associated Press to other categories of property, the 
majority held that the Associated Press was entitled to an injunction against 
publication of its news stories by International News Service.134 Holmes agreed 
that an injunction was appropriate, but he rejected the majority’s formalism, 
writing that property is “a creation of law” rather than some pre-existing 
entity.135 Brandeis dissented on the ground that the complexity of determining 
the proper boundaries of this new property right and the appropriate remedies 
were best left to legislators. He would have “decline[d] to establish a new 
rule . . . in the effort to redress a newly-disclosed wrong, although the propriety 
of some remedy appears to be clear.”136 Eskridge and Frickey describe the 
difference between the Holmes and Brandeis views as “[t]he difference between 
a simple law-is-policy viewpoint and a law-is-policy-but-also-institutional-
architecture viewpoint.”137 
In the 1920s and 1930s, Felix Frankfurter and James Landis “deployed the 
institutional competence idea to develop a framework for 
justifying . . . lawmaking by agencies.”138 Beginning in the 1920s, Frankfurter 
“constructed his ‘Public Utilities’ seminar at the Harvard Law School around 
the institutional competence idea.”139 In 1930, Frankfurter argued that the 
development of “useful policies depend[ed] not only upon the enactment of good 
 
 128.  Id. at lix–lxii. 
 129. Id. at lx. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918). 
 132. HART & SACKS, supra note 7, at 527. 
 133. See Eskridge & Frickey, Historical Introduction, supra note 9, at lix. 
 134. Int’l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 215. 
 135. Id. at 246 (Holmes, J., concurring). 
 136. Id. at 267 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 137. Eskridge & Frickey, Historical Introduction, supra note 9, at lix. 
 138. Id. at lxi. 
 139. Id. at lx. 
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legislation and judicial deference to those legislative judgments . . . but much 
more upon the elaboration and application of those policies by an expert 
administration.”140 These ideas were further developed by Landis in his 1938 
book, Administrative Process. Landis “argued that the expansion of 
administrative agencies ‘sprang from a distrust of the ability of the judicial 
process to make the necessary adjustments in the development of both law and 
regulatory methods, as they related to particular industrial problems.’”141 The 
problem with looking to courts was that judges “too often held economic and 
social opinions opposed to ideals of their time.”142 In contrast, to courts whose 
“decisions are influenced by . . . unsophisticated policy views,” administrative 
agencies “are more sophisticated, better able to assemble the data and balance 
the socio-economic factors, and more democratically accountable.”143 
Moreover, “the case-by-case approach is too slow and imprecise for laying out 
workable rules for society to follow.”144 These themes of competence and 
accountability had, of course, appeared in Pound’s early writing and they would 
be central to the mature legal process scholarship of the 1950s. 
Green and Llewellyn were writing during this period, and they might well 
have agreed with the strand of institutional competence scholarship that 
recognized the advantages of legislative and administrative solutions. Green for 
example, wrote that compensation plans, modeled after workers’ compensation 
plans and tailored to specific classes of cases, represented “a more rational 
process for imposing responsibility.”145 However, Green’s preference for this 
more rational process did not mean that he gave up on courts as a vehicle for the 
reform of traditional tort law, which after all, was littered with no-duty rules that 
denied injured victims recovery despite defendant negligence.146 Courts and 
judicial lawmaking could modify and eliminate such rules, and Green proposed 
just that.  
Llewellyn, as we have seen, also saw courts as a vehicle for reform, but his 
major efforts were aimed at legislative reform. These efforts would reach 
fruition in the 1960s with the widespread adoptions of Article 2 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, “the sales article of the most successful codification in 
American law.”147 Along the way to that, however, he also encountered the 
powerful forces that might block legislative reform. In 1940 and 1941, 
Llewellyn proposed, as part of his new law of sales, a manufacturer’s implied 
warranty that its products would be free from dangerous defects.148 This 
 
 140. Id. at lxi. 
 141. Id. at lxi (quoting JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 30 (1938)). 
 142. LANDIS, supra note 141, at 34. 
 143. Eskridge & Frickey, Historical Introduction, supra note 9, at lxi–lxii. 
 144. Id. at lxi. 
 145. Green, supra note 50, at 271. 
 146. See, e.g., id.  
 147. Zipporah Batshaw Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and the Merchant Rules, 100 HARV. 
L. REV. 465, 466 (1987); see also NOLAN & URSIN, supra note 24, at 82–83. 
 148. Wiseman, supra note 147, at 507. 
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warranty would impose an “absolute liability . . . on manufacturers for injury ‘in 
person or property’ incurred by anyone ‘in the ordinary course of use or 
consumption . . . by reason of the defect’ in the goods.”149 Llewellyn’s proposed 
sales law was considered in the 1940s by the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.150 At the 1941 Conference, after 
Merchants’ representatives voiced opposition, Llewellyn dropped the warranty 
provision entirely. When asked about the deletion at the 1943 meeting, 
“Llewellyn replied that ‘every time we tried to draw’ the rule, it [so] ‘scare[d] 
everybody that they saw it pea green.’”151 Llewellyn thus knew both the 
theoretical advantages and practical difficulties of legislative solutions. 
Eskridge and Frickey write that “[b]etween 1938 and 1958, most of the 
ground-breaking work [of legal process scholars] was accomplished in the form 
of teaching materials.”152 Hart, with co-authors Abe Feller and Walter Gellhorn, 
produced Materials on Legislation, a mimeographed set of materials for use 
beginning in the 1941–42 academic year. It was primarily used in Legislation 
courses at Harvard, Yale, and Columbia.153 The first chapter of these materials, 
“the centerpiece of the course,”154 was designed “to make explicit comparisons 
among the three main sources of law: common law, statutes, and private 
ordering.”155 The focus of the chapter was Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw’s 1854 
opinion in Norway Plains Co. v. Boston & Maine Railroad.156 
In Norway Plains, Shaw limited the liability of common carrier railroads 
for damage to goods once they are unloaded onto the railroad platform. In 
correspondence with Hart and Feller, quoted by Eskridge and Frickey, Gellhorn 
wrote that the issue of common carrier liability revealed “the lack of adaptation 
of judicial machinery for acquiring insight into the social and economic data 
upon which ‘policy’ judgments rest.”157 In addition to a greater ability of 
legislatures to make well-informed policy judgments, legislatures had 
“machinery the courts do not possess,” including the ability to delegate tasks to 
agencies and a greater “arsenal of sanctions.”158 
By that date, World War II had drawn Hart into governmental service in 
the Office of Price Administration and then in the Office of Economic 
Stabilization, as Associate General Counsel and General Counsel, 
respectively.159 Hart returned to teaching his Harvard Legislation course in the 
1946–47 academic year and began the course with an examination of Shaw’s 
 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 478–80. 
 151. Id. at 523–24 n.255. 
 152. Eskridge & Frickey, Historical Introduction, supra note 9, at lxviii. 
 153. Id. at lxxiv. 
 154. Id. at lxxv. 
 155. Id. 
 156. 67 Mass. (1 Gray) 263 (1854).  
 157. Eskridge & Frickey, Historical Introduction, supra note 9, at lxxv. 
 158. Id. (quoting Letter from Walter Gellhorn, to A.H. Feller, Professor, Yale Law School, and Henry M. 
Hart, Professor, Harvard Law School (Jan. 29, 1941)). 
 159. Id. at lxxviii. 
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opinion in Norway Plains. According to Hart’s notes on this course, quoted by 
Eskridge and Frickey, he used Norway Plains “to develop a theory of 
appropriate judicial lawmaking . . . .”160 Hart “aggressively criticized Shaw’s 
opinion, for ‘making a judgment as to what would be a good rule,’ rather than 
making a ‘reasoned application . . . of basic principle to the case.”161 Hart found 
Shaw’s approach to be “unacceptable, not because it was judicial lawmaking 
(inevitable in the case), but because it was lawmaking beyond the capability of 
a court.” 162 In Hart’s view, “[a] court in making law is bound to base its action 
not on free judgment of the relative social advantage, but on a process of 
reasoned development of authoritative starting points (i.e., statutes, prior judicial 
decisions . . .).”163 Legislatures, in Hart’s view, have comparative advantages 
over courts in setting “starting points.” “The function of legislatures is to 
ascertain ‘legislative facts’ about society in order to determine what rule or 
principle of law the country should adopt, and courts should defer to the 
legislature’s findings.”164 Eskridge and Frickey write that Hart returned to this 
“theory of adjudication” at the end of the course. 
Of course, two years prior to this, in his Escola concurring opinion, Justice 
Traynor unabashedly made a judgment as to what would be a good rule in 
proposing that his court adopt a strict liability rule in cases involving defective 
products.165 And he openly based this rule on a judgment of social advantage, 
writing that the overwhelming misfortune to a person injured by a defective 
product was “needless[,] . . . for the risk of injury can be insured by the 
manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost of doing business.”166  
Similarly, Holmes’s view of Shaw could not be more different from that of 
Hart. Like Hart, Holmes analyzed a Shaw decision limiting defendant liability. 
In Brown v. Kendall, Shaw had rejected both the possibility of adopting a strict 
liability (under the writ system) and the imposition of a duty of extraordinary 
care (as the trial court had done). Instead, Shaw held that plaintiffs must prove a 
lack of due care by defendants in order to recover.167 Holmes applauded Shaw 
for making a judgment as to what would be a good rule. And Shaw was praised 
precisely because he made a judgment of the relevant social advantage. Holmes 
wrote that “the strength of that great judge lay in an accurate appreciation of the 
requirements of the community.”168 Indeed, “few have lived who were his equals 
in their understanding of the grounds of public policy to which all laws must 
ultimately be referred. It was this which made him . . . the greatest magistrate 
 
 160. Id. at lxxix. 
 161. Id.  
 162. Id.  
 163. Id. at lxxix–lxxx. 
 164. Id. at lxxx. 
 165.  Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 440–41 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., 
concurring). 
 166.  Id. at 441 (Traynor, J., concurring). 
 167. Brown v. Kendall,  60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292, 296 (Mass. 1850). 
 168.  OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 106 (1881). 
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which this country has produced.”169 Along these lines it is useful to remember 
that Brown v. Kendall, along with other Shaw-created doctrines of contributory 
negligence and assumption of risk, formed the framework for the tort law 
governing accidental injury.170 
In 1952, Albert Sacks, a former graduate student of Hart’s, joined the 
Harvard faculty. In 1953 or 1954, Hart and Sacks began their collaboration on 
what would become The Legal Process, which would retain Shaw’s Norway 
Plains opinion as a central focus when it appeared in the “tentative” (but final) 
edition in 1958. 
C. LEGAL PROCESS JURISPRUDENCE AND ENTERPRISE LIABILITY  
As previously noted, Lemuel Shaw had been seen as a model judge by 
Charles Gregory, who hoped for a generation of Shaw-like judges writing the 
enterprise liability theory into law. In contrast, Shaw was far from a model judge 
for Hart and Sacks. Shaw’s opinion in Norway Plains retained its central place 
when The Legal Process materials appeared in 1958. In the view of Hart and 
Sacks, a Shaw-like court would have been exercising an impermissible 
“discretionary power” if it had limited railroad liability in an effort to shield the 
infant railroad industry from a broader liability that might stifle its growth. 171 In 
their view, policies like the promotion of economic growth should be left to 
legislatures which, unlike courts, are subject to electoral and political checks and 
are able to assemble and evaluate the social and economic data required for this 
type of lawmaking.172 Courts in contrast, should base their decision making on 
“a power of reasoned elaboration” from “existing arrangements,” such as the 
determination of common expectations in commercial transactions.173  
Robert Keeton and Henry Wellington sought to place similar limitations 
on judicial lawmaking in the common law.174 Wellington argued that courts 
properly rely on principles in their decision making, such as the principle that a 
wrongdoer should not profit from his own wrong. The use of policies, or 
 
 169.  Id. 
 170. See Brown, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) at 296; Farwell v. Bos. & Worcester R.R., 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 49, 54 
(Mass. 1842). 
 171. HART & SACKS, supra note 7, at 1398. 
 172. Id. at 397–98. Hart and Sacks were speaking of Shaw exempting the railroad industry from the “special 
liability as insurer of the safe carriage of goods” applied to other common carriers because applying that rule to 
the infant railroad industry would “operate as a deterrent to the growth of the industry.” Id. at 397. They wrote 
that “a large mass of information [would need] to be gathered and taken into account,” as well as “the opinions 
and preferences of railroad men, shippers, and other interested persons.” Id. at 398. They suggest that a court is 
not “as well equipped as a legislature to [collect such information and] find out what those opinions and 
preferences are.” Id. Moreover, “judgments of this kind call for the political check of the ballot box.” Id. These 
reasons would seem even more applicable to abolishing the special liability of all common carriers. 
 173. Id. at 398. The format that Hart and Sacks adopted to present this view was one of “leading questions” 
rather than clear, declarative statements. Hart and Sacks, however, did not regard their “questions” as merely 
questions. A leading question later becomes “the point earlier made.” Id. at 400; see also Wellington, supra note 
31, at 222–26 (stating that policy of subsidizing infant industry is inappropriate for judicial lawmaking). 
 174. See Ursin, supra note 16, at 1302, 1304–07; Ursin, supra note 70, at 296–98. 
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instrumental justifications, is more problematic.175 Wellington asserted that the 
use by courts of a policy to justify a common rule is “legitimate only if two 
conditions are met.”176 First, the “policy must be widely regarded as socially 
desirable . . . .”177 Also, the policy must be “relatively neutral.”178 As to the 
latter, a court should not use a policy if it imposes disproportionate burdens on 
a particular group (as contrasted with the population generally), unless there are 
special reasons that can be adduced for imposing those burdens.179 A policy of 
subsidizing infant industry would fail this test.180 Likewise, the promotion of 
collective bargaining, even if seen as socially desirable, “cannot serve as a 
justification for common law rules, for it fails of neutrality . . . . It is too 
partisan.”181 Wellington concluded that “[s]ince many policies which might 
serve as justification for rules fail of neutrality in that they are too partisan, 
common law courts, if they are to exercise power legitimately, are drastically 
limited in their capacity to implement policies.”182  
Robert Keeton also sought to place constraints on judicial lawmaking in 
the common law. He wrote that although both courts and legislators are 
lawmaking bodies, their capabilities and lawmaking roles differ.183 In his view, 
factors that militate against judicial lawmaking in specific situations include the 
“major and pervasive character” of a proposed action, its “controversial nature,” 
and its political nature.184 Keeton wrote that, as a practical matter, “[t]he more 
pervasive the scope” of a proposed change, “the harder it is to persuade courts 
the change is one they can properly make.”185 Courts, in his view, have an 
“obligation to act nonpolitically.”186 Although Keeton recognized that the 
distinction between what is “political or nonpolitical . . . is not one that . . . is 
likely to be formulated with precision,”187 he wrote that courts appropriately 
assess the degree to which proposed reforms “affect or become involved in 
 
 175. Wellington, supra note 31, at 222–26, 262. 
 176. Id. at 236. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id.  
 179. Id. at 238. 
 180. Id. at 226. Wellington’s example of a subsidy to infant industries is drawn from strict products liability. 
He writes that if a court had adopted this doctrine, it “could not justify a rule which granted an exemption from 
such liability to manufacturers of a newly developed product on the ground that the protection of infant industries 
is in the state’s economic best interest.” Id. This is because the granting of such a subsidy would be “at the 
expense of other groups—injured plaintiffs and established industries producing relatively substitutable 
products” and thus “fails of neutrality.” Id. at 226, 228. Wellington concludes that “[a]uthority to create a special 
class and redistribute income to it resides in the legislature.” Id. at 226. The clear implication is that a policy of 
loss distribution would also fail of neutrality because it favors injured plaintiffs “at the expense of other groups,” 
namely manufacturers. See id. at 226. 
 181. Id. at 239. 
 182. Id. at 241. 
 183. KEETON, supra note 30, at 92.  
 184. Id. at 43. 
 185. Id. at 45. 
 186. Id. at 93. 
 187. Id. 
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current political controversy” and “abstain from initiating reforms 
that . . . would be generally regarded as essentially political in nature.”188 Citing 
Wechsler, Keeton wrote of the “obligation of the court[s] to reach principled 
decisions—decisions that not only are reasoned but also are grounded on 
premises of nonpartisan character.”189  
These constraints may seem nebulous and vague. Their purpose, however, 
was made clear in a pair of articles Keeton published in 1959 and 1962. It was 
to place jurisprudential obstacles in front of his nemesis, the agenda of the 1956 
Harper and James tort treatise. In that treatise, Harper and James had proclaimed 
that they believed that 
in accident cases . . . compensation and some form of social insurance (like 
workmen’s compensation) [is] . . . desirable and that until this can be had, 
every aspect of the present system which produces some of the benefits of 
social insurance should be fostered, and every aspect which thwarts those 
benefits should be minimized.190  
Keeton recognized that Harper and James were among those who had “urged 
with increasing vigor that a loss should be shifted from plaintiff to defendant if 
defendant is a more efficient loss distributor.”191 For Keeton, this raised “the 
specter of runaway social engineering with ill-considered emphasis on risk-
spreading capacity.”192 In response, Keeton wrote that “a sharp change in our 
system of compensation of accidental injuries, shifting from the present system 
with its premise of liability based on fault to a system based on a premise of loss 
distribution or insurance, is beyond the sphere of desirable judicial creativity.”193 
The word that bears emphasizing in that last sentence is judicial, for Keeton 
and co-author Jeffrey O’Connell embraced just such a sharp change by 
legislation. In their 1965 book, Basic Protection for the Traffic Victim, Keeton 
and O’Connell addressed the problem posed by automobile accidents.194 Here, 
Keeton embraced the solution whose origins lay in enterprise liability 
scholarship dating back at least as far as Leon Green. That was the proposal for 
no-fault automobile compensation plans. Keeton and O’Connell wrote that “the 
burden of a minimum level of protection against measurable economic 
loss . . . [should] be treated as a cost of motoring.”195 Absent was the rejection 
 
 188. Id. at 92. 
 189. Robert E. Keeton, Creative Continuity in the Law of Torts, 75 HARV. L. REV. 463, 467 (1962) (citing 
Wechlser, supra note 19, at 19). 
 190. 2 HARPER & JAMES, JR., supra note 61, at 1069 n.5. 
 191. Keeton, supra note 33, at 405. Keeton recognized that risk spreading had some influence on tort law. 
Id. at 407. He argued, however, that notions of “individual blameworthiness” are the basis of tort law 
developments. Id. at 443–44.  
 192. Id. at 444. 
 193. Keeton, supra note 189, at 508. 
 194. ROBERT E. KEETON & JEFFREY O’CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM: A 
BLUEPRINT FOR REFORMING AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 268 (1965). 
 195. Id. 
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of the loss spreading policy, as Keeton and O’Connell wrote that the “cost would 
be distributed generally . . . without regard to fault.”196 
It was a different story, however, when it came to the enterprise liability 
proposal for courts to adopt a doctrine of strict products liability, based in part 
on the loss spreading policy.197 This was an example of a proposal for courts to 
initiate “a sharp change . . . from the present system . . . [premised] on fault to a 
system based on a premise of loss distribution or insurance.”198 Thus, Keeton 
might have explained why, on legal process grounds, such a change “is beyond 
the sphere of desirable judicial creativity.”199 Instead, Keeton focused on one 
strand of argument made by enterprise liability scholars, that the food products 
cases provided the stepping stone to a broader strict products liability premised 
on the loss spreading policy. Writing in 1959, Keeton rejected the contention 
“that the grocer’s capacity for risk spreading is the basis of his liability [because] 
such [a similar] liability is not imposed on retailers of other products though a 
similar and often superior capacity for risk spreading exists.”200 He wrote that 
he found the “prima facie ground of liability . . . difficult to grasp because of the 
difficulty of finding material distinctions between selling food and selling some 
other product which, if defective, is likely to cause harm.”201 He concluded that  
sound prediction and sound development of the scope of liability . . . rests 
less on comparison of the relative capacities of plaintiff and defendant, or 
classes including them, to insure or otherwise spread the risk, than upon 
identifying other grounds for liability in [the case of] the sale of food.202 
The next year, in 1960, however, the New Jersey Supreme Court, in 
Henningsen v. Broomfield Motors, Inc., demonstrated that food was not unique 
as it extended strict liability to the manufacturers and retailers of automobiles.203 
Keeton’s reaction to his own failure of prediction? He all but ignored that 
landmark case. Writing in 1962, Keeton buried Henningsen in a list of fourteen 
“precedents overruled in decisions of very recent vintage,”204 such as precedents 
dealing with immunities, mental suffering, and prenatal injuries, referring to it 
merely as “extensions of strict liability.”205 A footnote simply cited 
Henningsen.206  
 
 196. Id. 
 197. See, e.g., Fleming James, Jr., General Products—Should Manufacturers Be Liable Without 
Negligence?, 24 TENN. L. REV. 923, 923–24 (1957). 
 198. Keeton, supra note 189, at 508. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Keeton, supra note 33, at 443. 
 201. Id. at 442. 
 202. Id. at 443. 
 203. 161 A.2d 69, 100–01 (N.J. 1960). 
 204. Keeton, supra note 189, at 484–86. 
 205. Id. at 486. 
 206. Id. at 486 n.60. Keeton’s list of precedents overruled includes “privity.” Id. at 486. A footnote cites 
Henningsen with the parenthetical “suit by automobile purchaser’s wife against manufacturer and retailer.” Id. 
at 486 n.59. 
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A clear example of the application of legal process-like thinking is 
provided in a 1965 article by Richard Speidel, whose academic specialty was 
the law of sales. Speidel compared the approach to strict liability under the 
Uniform Commercial Code with that under tort law. In doing so, he raised 
objections to judicial adoption of strict products liability which could well have 
come out of the legal process playbook. “In essence,” he wrote, “through ‘strict 
liability’ the judicial process achieves a form of regulation over the recurring 
and nationwide relationship between the more powerful business enterprise and 
the less powerful individual user or consumer.”207 In imposing strict liability, 
the courts had chosen “to intervene on behalf of the consumer.”208 In doing so, 
they have “weighed the interest of the enterprise as a legislature would, and 
found it wanting.”209 However, adoption of this new legal regime “by its nature, 
requires an elaborate procedure for factual investigation and evaluation,” which 
unlike a legislature, courts are unable to undertake.210 Thus, he wrote, “one can 
doubt the long-range feasibility of having the large premises involved in a public 
law approach to products liability created by common-law judges whose 
thinking is enmeshed with all the common-law distinctions.”211 “[W]hen courts 
take the bold step toward imposing and justifying strict products liability without 
legislative authorization and assistance, a . . . legitimate basis for criticism 
exists.”212 
As previously discussed, James had launched an “assault on the citadel of 
fault”213 as he applauded expansive liability doctrines within the fault system 
and urged the limitation of doctrines, such as assumption of risk, that thwarted 
recovery even when negligence was present. His goal was to attain the “benefits 
and values of social insurance . . . under [the fault system].”214 Keeton rejected 
the view of some (with a footnote to Harper and James) whose preference was 
for “candid reliance on a principle of loss distribution” but who supported 
“manipulation of doctrine over adherence both in result and in reasoning to 
liability based on fault.”215 This approach “often [had] impl[ied] that it is 
appropriate for a decision reached under the influence of the [loss 
distribution] . . . principle to be explained in the judicial opinion solely on 
another ground, unrelated to that principle save in the coincidence that both lead 
to the same result in the particular case.”216  
 
 207. Richard E. Speidel, The Virginia “Anti-Privity” Statute: Strict Products Liability Under the Uniform 
Commercial Code, 51 VA. L. REV. 804, 845 n.103 (1965). 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. at 846 n.103. 
 212. Id.  
 213. James, Jr., supra note 62, at 374. 
 214. James, Jr., supra note 32, at 552; see also James, Jr., & Dickinson, supra note 32, at 782–94. 
 215. Keeton, supra note 189, at 465. 
 216. Id. Once again, the position of Harper and James is in sharp contrast. 2 HARPER & JAMES, JR., THE 
LAW OF TORTS, supra note 61, at 1069–70 n.5 (“[I]n accident cases we believe compensation and some form of 
social insurance (like workman’s compensation) to be desirable and that until this can be had, every aspect of 
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III.  JUSTICE ROGER TRAYNOR, ENTERPRISE LIABILITY, AND LEGAL PROCESS 
JURISPRUDENCE 
A. JUSTICE ROGER TRAYNOR AND ENTERPRISE LIABILITY 
 As we have seen, Charles Gregory, writing in 1951, had called for a 
generation of Shaw-like judges to step up to the task of reforming tort law. 
Perhaps unknown to Gregory, such a judge had been a member of the California 
Supreme Court for a decade at that point. That judge, of course, was Roger 
Traynor whose 1944 Escola proposal for strict products liability placed him 
firmly in the enterprise liability camp.217  
In a 1965 article which appeared shortly after his opinion for a unanimous 
court in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products Inc. had written his Escola proposal 
into law,218 Traynor made clear that strict products liability was part of his 
broader embrace of the enterprise liability theory.219 Like James, Traynor saw 
strict products liability as part of a broader “enterprise liability or social 
insurance,”220 which included the imposition of strict liability “for industrial 
injuries covered by workmen’s compensation, and for injuries caused by ultra-
hazardous activities.”221 In Traynor’s view, these developments “presage[d] the 
abandonment of longstanding concepts of fault in accident cases. The significant 
innovations in products liability may well be carried over to such cases.”222 
Thus, he wrote, “[t]he cases on products liability are emerging as early chapters 
of a modern history on strict liability that will take long in the writing. There is 
a wealth of analogy yet to be developed.”223 Of course, this wealth of analogy 
might be developed by courts as suggested by the products cases. But it might 
also be developed by legislatures.224 Thus, Traynor wrote that “in time the 
 
the present system which produces some of the benefits of social insurance should be fostered, and every aspect 
which thwarts those benefits should be minimized. Further, we believe that fault is an outmoded criterion of 
liability in this field, so that any attempt to pursue fault more effectively is at best a barking up the wrong tree. 
And if the more rigorous pursuit of fault tends to block some of the already attainable benefits of social 
insurance . . . then we think it would be like spending good money for fool’s gold.”). 
 217. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440–41 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring). 
 218. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Products Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963) (adopting strict products 
liability). 
 219. See Traynor, supra note 34. 
 220. Id. at 376. 
 221. Id. at 375.   
 222. Id. Looking to the future, Traynor recognized the looming problem of giving content to the defect 
requirement, writing that “[n]o single definition of defect has proved adequate to define the scope of the 
manufacturer’s strict liability in tort for physical injuries.” Id. at 373. After surveying the various tests that had 
been proposed, he wrote that “[t]he complications surrounding the definition of a defect suggest inquiry as to 
whether defectiveness is the appropriate touchstone of liability. Id. at 372. 
 223. Id. at 376. Here, also, Traynor’s approach resembled that of James who, in 1957, wrote that where 
existing areas of strict liability “lend themselves to natural and easy extension . . . courts should make the 
extension.” James, Jr., supra note 197, at 924. 
 224. Of particular concern to Traynor was the problem of the auto accident where “the need for 
compensating victims regardless of fault is most urgent.” Traynor, Ways and Meanings, supra note 34, at 375. 
This urgency was driven by the fact that “[o]n the highways . . . injury and slaughter are not occasional events, 
but the order of the day . . . sooner or later there is bound to be more rational distribution of their costs than is 
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accident problem [might be] . . . solved through some compensation scheme that 
covers the basic economic losses of accident victims . . . .”225  
Traynor’s focus on basic economic losses reflected the fact that he, like 
James, recognized that the expansion of liability had implications for the 
damages to be awarded. Thus, Traynor wrote, “Any system of enterprise liability 
or social insurance designed to replace existing tort law as the means for 
compensating injured parties should provide adequate but not undue 
compensation.”226 This meant that “once adequate compensation for economic 
loss is assured, consideration might well be given to establishing curbs on such 
potentially inflationary damages as those for pain and suffering. Otherwise the 
cost of assured compensation could become prohibitive.”227  
If the enterprise liability vision expressed in Traynor’s Escola opinion and 
the Harper and James treatise was to be achieved by the rewriting of tort law by 
courts, jurisprudential obstacles would have to be overcome. Of course, there 
would be the objections of legal process scholars. But these objections would 
not surface until the late 1950s. In the real world of judges and lawyers, however, 
a more formidable obstacle was posed by the firm grip that legal formalism held 
on the profession. Judges, in this view, are not lawmakers and policy does not 
and should not play a role in their decision making. This was likely to have been 
the view of the rank and file of lawyers and judges in the 1950s and 1960s. 
Indicative of the hold that legal formalism held on the profession was the 
previously discussed prominence of Warren Seavey’s writings in the 1967 
edition of the Harvard Law Review’s Essays on the Law of Torts.228 Seavey’s 
Principles of Torts was selected to be the opening article in the collection.229 
This highly formalistic treatment of “fundamental” tort principles suggested that 
tort law had by then crystalized and could be restated as immutable principles. 
The implication was that which Seavey stated in his piece on Cardozo: the task 
of the lawyer or judges was “to see the plan and pattern underlying the law and 
to make clear the paths which had been obscured by the undergrowth of illogical 
reasoning.”230 
  
 
now possible under the law of negligence.” Id. It is likely, however, that Traynor did not see the judicial 
imposition of strict liability as the answer to this problem. See Maloney v. Ruth, 445 P.2d 513 (Cal. 1968) 
(refusing to apply a strict liability rule in cases of automobile accidents, but holding that a vehicle owner could 
not delegate the statutory duty to maintain safe breaks). Perhaps coincidentally, the same year that Ways and 
Meanings appeared, the landmark Keeton O’Connell automobile no-fault proposal was published. See KEETON 
& O’CONNELL, supra note 194. 
 225. Traynor, supra note 34, at 376. Should this occur, Traynor wrote that the question would be “whether 
the law of negligence as we know it today . . . will atrophy or will survive in a diminished role to afford additional 
compensation to victims whose injuries are caused by actual fault on the part of others.” Id. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 228. HARV. L. REV. ASS’N, ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF TORTS (1962). 
 229. Id. at 1; see Seavey, Principles of Torts, supra note 71. 
 230. Seavey, supra note 48, at 372. 
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B. JUSTICE TRAYNOR’S LEGAL PRAGMATISM 
Although Traynor’s academic career prior to his appointment to the 
California Supreme Court in 1940 had featured notable scholarship, he had 
published no extrajudicial works during his first decade and a half on the court. 
Beginning in 1956, however, Traynor began to publish regularly—with his 
primary subject being the role of courts in making law. Two articles, in 
particular, stand out, each apparently a response to an important jurisprudential 
event. 
The first, Law and Social Change in a Democratic Society,231 appeared in 
1956, two years after the United States Supreme Court’s then-controversial 
decision in Brown v. Board of Education.232 Surely, this was a time for a 
prominent judge to address the topic of law, social change, and the lawmaking 
role of courts in a democratic society. Especially so when that judge was Roger 
Traynor, author of his court’s landmark 1948 decision in Perez v. Sharp.233 This 
decision overturned his state’s anti-miscegenation legislation, a position that the 
Warren Court would hesitate to take until nearly two decades later.234 
In all likelihood, when Traynor wrote Law and Social Change, he had in 
mind both formalists and critics of the constitutional decisions of the United 
States Supreme Court. Law and Social Change shows no concern with academic 
writing on the subject of judicial lawmaking. Indeed, Traynor was probably 
unaware of the legal process-type thinking that had been developing during the 
first half of the twentieth century. As previously noted, most of the ground-
breaking work in this area had appeared in the form of teaching materials, not in 
scholarly publications that would have made it widely available. Nevertheless, 
Traynor’s legal pragmatism stands as an implicit rebuttal to the full-blown legal 
process viewpoint that would soon emerge.  
Things changed with the 1959 publication of Hebert Wechsler’s Toward 
Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law and Henry Hart’s The Time Chart of 
the Justices.235 The appearance of these cornerstones of legal process 
jurisprudence appears to have prompted the second of the two articles on which 
 
 231. Traynor, supra note 18.  
 232. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 233. 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948). Like Holmes, Traynor believed that courts generally should defer to legislative 
judgments. He would later write, quoting the United States Supreme Court, that “it is not for [courts] . . . to pass 
judgement on the wisdom of legislation.” Traynor, supra note 18, at 240. Traynor, however, lived in a different 
age than Holmes (or, for that matter, Cardozo and the legal realists), an age of increasing sensitivity to issues of 
racial justice. And he stood at the forefront of this new age. In 1948, six years before Brown v. Board of 
Education, Traynor wrote the opinion in Perez v. Sharp holding California’s anti-miscegenation statute 
unconstitutional, preceding the United States Supreme Court’s similar decision by twenty years. Perez, 198 P.2d 
at 29. Just as Escola marked the movement of a major enterprise liability theory from the realm of academic 
writing to the opinions of jurists, so Perez v. Sharp hinted at an era in which laws which discriminated on the 
basis of race would come under constitutional scrutiny. At the time they were written, these opinions were 
revolutionary—and the revolution would eventually succeed. 
 234. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 235. Wechsler, supra note 19; see also Hart, Jr., supra note 19.  
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I focus: the 1961 No Magic Words Can Do It Justice.236 Unlike Law and Social 
Change, Magic Words directly addressed not only the Wechsler and Hart 
articles, but also other contemporary writings on the subject of judicial 
lawmaking.237 
Traynor began his 1956 Law and Social Change with the theme of social 
change, writing that we have “left . . . the silent plains of the nineteenth century 
when laissez faire commanded easy acceptance.”238 The social policies of 
“laissez faire had ceased to be acceptable by the [D]epression years.”239 As a 
consequence of the Great Depression and two World Wars, the nation had been 
“compelled . . . to realize that each of us has a direct responsibility for the 
general welfare.”240 It was thus inevitable that “some part of that obligation had 
to be made legally enforceable by a society given the opprobrious term of 
‘welfare state’ by those who would have it remain static.”241 The Great 
Depression and the New Deal legislation that followed had made clear that 
“[m]ore than ever social problems [had found] . . . their solution in 
legislation.”242 Nevertheless, Traynor wrote, “[e]ndless problems 
remain . . . which the courts must resolve without [the] benefit of legislation.”243 
It followed that “[c]ourts have a creative job to do when they find that a rule has 
lost its touch with reality and should be abandoned or reformulated to meet new 
conditions and new moral values.”244 Their task thus was to “hammer out new 
rules that will respect whatever values of the past have survived the tests of 
reason and experience and anticipate what contemporary values will best meet 
those tests.”245 In this embrace of what we would identify today as legal 
pragmatism, Traynor followed in the footstep of Holmes, Cardozo, Green, and 
Llewellyn—and anticipated Judge Posner’s writing more than three decades 
later on this subject.246 
“In the pragmatic search for solutions,” Traynor wrote, “the law 
professor . . . has a special task.”247 In Traynor’s view, judges could “benefit 
[from the] . . . seasoned reflection on a particular subject that marks the work of 
the scholar.”248 “The demolition of obsolete theories . . . leaves [courts] . . . free 
to weigh competing policies without preconceptions that purport to compel the 
 
 236. Traynor, supra note 19. 
 237. Id. at 623–25. 
 238. Traynor, supra note 18, at 231. 
 239. Id.  
 240. Id.  
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. at 232. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id.  
 245. Id.  
 246. Judge Posner writes that “judges in our system are legislators as well as adjudicators,” and policy plays 
an important role in their lawmaking. See POSNER, supra note 13, at 118, 238. 
 247. Traynor, supra note 18, at 232. 
 248. Id. at 233. 
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decision but in fact do not.”249 A judge, he wrote, “has a better chance to arrive 
at the least erroneous answer if the scholars have labored in advance to break 
ground for new paths.”250 The law professor has the privilege of perspective that 
enables him to make “prophetic generalization from the host of cases . . . to 
[chart a] . . . course” for courts to follow.251 
As if written to order, the Harper and James tort treatise appeared the same 
year that Law and Social Change was published. Harper and James translated 
the values of the welfare state into a tort agenda, charting a course for courts to 
follow—much as Traynor’s own Escola concurring opinion had done. 
With his court’s revolutionary tort decisions still a few years in the 
future,252 Traynor focused on the law of divorce as one example of the need for 
courts to “hammer out new rules” to meet contemporary values.253 The 
“vigorous growth” of the law, he wrote, would be impeded if courts perpetuated 
“nice rules that fail to meet the problems of real people.”254 Such had been the 
case in California divorce law in the 1950s. At that time, divorce was governed 
by the “withered dogma that divorce can be granted only for marital fault,” such 
as adultery.255 Moreover, the law was “rendered . . . [even] more irrational by 
the widespread rule that recrimination,” such as adultery on the part of the other 
party, was “an absolute defense.”256 The consequence of the failure to meet the 
problems of real people had been that “[r]ules insensitive to reality 
[had] . . . been cynically circumvented by litigants and attorneys with the tacit 
sanction of the courts.”257 The result, Traynor wrote, was a “discrepancy 
between law in dogmatic theory and law in action, evading dogma by fiction and 
subterfuge.”258 
However, in an opinion by Justice Traynor, the California Supreme Court 
demonstrated that courts were not completely powerless to replace fiction and 
subterfuge with overt doctrinal change by a “reinterpretation” of the governing 
statute. It did so by ruling that divorce courts have discretion to grant or deny a 
divorce as the public interest indicated.259 But this was only a first step. As 
Traynor wrote in Law and Social Change, “[e]ven with this major change,” 
fault-based divorce law remained “a formidable antique around which people 
 
 249. Id. at 234. 
 250. Id. Long before “law-and” scholarship became fashionable among legal academics, Traynor called on 
law professors “to draw on pertinent extralegal knowledge of scholars in other fields” so that courts might also 
draw on such knowledge. Id. Traynor noted that “[m]edicine and business [had] . . . . long since put to good use 
our growing knowledge of human behavior,” but he lamented the fact that “many of the rules of evidence still 
rest on lay assumptions of how people react under various circumstances.” Id. at 235.  
 251. Id. at 232. 
 252. But see Malloy v. Fong, 232 P.2d 241 (1951) (abolishing charitable immunity). 
 253. Traynor, supra note 18, at 232. 
 254. Id. at 236. 
 255. Id.  
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. 
 258. Id. 
 259. De Burgh v. De Burgh, 250 P.2d 598, 603–08 (Cal. 1952). 
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step warily.”260 Thus, Traynor asked rhetorically, “Is it not time for lawyers to 
rouse themselves from their inertia and work actively for legislation in this field 
that will make the integrity of the law a meaningful phrase?”261 Following 
Traynor’s lead, the California legislature, in fact, enacted the nation’s first no-
fault divorce law. Traynor’s recrimination opinion has been widely credited with 
laying the foundation for this legislation.262 
Halfway through Law and Social Change, Traynor turned to issues of 
constitutional law, and while judicial lawmaking in the area of constitutional law 
is not the focus of the present Article, discussion of this subject is essential to an 
understanding of Traynor’s relationship to legal process thinking. In Law and 
Social Change, Traynor wrote that judges are “bound . . . to recognize that the 
task of law reform is that of the legislators, which is to say that it is primarily 
that of the people.”263 Thus, “[h]owever sensitive judges become to the need for 
law reform to match our spectacular growth, they must necessarily keep their 
dispassionate distance from that ball of fire that is the living law, and hope for 
wisdom to give it coherent direction when it spins their way.”264 The last phrase 
in that credo is the key one because courts at the time had found that the ball of 
fire often spun their way. 
Traynor thus wrote that he was “bound to be aware of the signs that we 
may cross new frontiers in constitutional law.”265 Prominent among these new 
frontiers, of course, was Brown v. Board of Education,266 which was being 
denounced at the time as unprincipled judicial activism. Especially strident were 
white Southerners who “charged the Court with ignoring precedent, 
transgressing original intent, indulging in sociology, infringing on the reserved 
rights of states, and usurping legislative authority.”267 A particularly notable 
critic was a prominent Southern newspaper editor, James J. Kilpatrick, who 
wrote that 
in May of 1954, that inept fraternity of politicians and professors known as 
the United States Supreme Court chose to throw away the established law. 
These nine men repudiated the Constitution, sp[a]t upon the [T]enth 
[A]mendment, and rewrote the fundamental law of this land to suit their own 
gauzy concepts of sociology.268  
Similarly, the conservative National Review denounced Brown, calling it “an act 
of judicial usurpation,” one that ran “patently counter to the intent of the 
 
 260. Traynor, supra note 18, at 236. 
 261. Id. 
 262. FIELD, supra note 13, at xiv, 64–65. 
 263. Traynor, supra note 18, at 239. 
 264. Id. 
 265. Id. at 237. 
 266. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  
 267. Michael J. Klarman, Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge), 104 MICH. L. REV. 431, 487 (2005). 
 268. Id. (quoting Court Order Gets Varied Reaction from Region’s Newspaper, SO. SCH. NEWS (Nashville), 
June 8, 1955, at 8, 9).  
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Constitution,” and was “shoddy and illegal in analysis, and invalid as 
sociology.”269 
In contrast to this heated rhetoric, Traynor reported in a matter-of-fact tone 
that “changes in public opinion on race discrimination have compelled 
reinterpretation of the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment, itself a product of violent 
social change.”270 Moreover, he continued, “[i]t is now widely, if not 
universally, accepted that there is no rational basis in any law for race 
discrimination, that it is an insidiously evil thing that deprives the community of 
the best of all its people as it deprives individuals and groups to give of their 
best.” Thus, “[i]t has long been accepted that discriminatory state action [such 
as segregation in public schools] must yield to the [F]ourteenth 
[A]mendment.”271 So, what was a “shoddy and illegal analysis” for the National 
Review editors was, for Traynor, simply a statement by the Supreme Court of 
the “widely, if not universally, accepted [view] that there is no rational basis in 
any law for . . . the insidiously evil thing” of race discrimination.272 
Noting, however, that the United States Supreme Court had “stated that it 
is not for them to pass judgment on the wisdom of legislation,” Traynor wrote 
that the California Supreme Court had “accepted that thesis.”273 Of course, there 
was a 
qualification to this general thesis articulated by Justice Jackson in Board of 
Education v. Barnette: “The very purpose of the Bill of Rights was to 
withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to 
place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them 
as legal principles to be applied by the courts.”274  
Thus, Traynor wrote, courts have an “active responsibility in the safeguard of 
those civil liberties that are the sum and substance of citizenship.”275 
Here, Traynor parted company with Judge Learned Hand, perhaps the most 
respected judge of the time, who in his essay, The Spirit of Liberty, had 
suggested that “we . . . rest our hopes too much upon constitutions, upon laws, 
and upon courts.” 276 “These are false hopes,” Hand wrote.  
Liberty lies in the hearts of men and women; when it dies there, no 
constitution, no law, no court can save it; no constitution, no law, no court 
can even do much to help it. While it lies there it needs no constitution, no 
law, no court to save it.277 
 
 269. See William Voegeli, Civil Rights and the Conservative Movement, in LIFE, LIBERTY, AND THE PURSUIT 
OF HAPPINESS: TEN YEARS OF THE CLAREMONT REVIEW OF BOOKS 96 (2012) (quoting National Review 
following the Brown decision).  
 270. Traynor, supra note 18, at 237. 
 271. Id. 
 272. Id. 
 273. Id. at 240. 
 274. Id. at 241 (footnote omitted); see also W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
 275. Traynor, supra note 18, at 241. 
 276. THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY: PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF LEARNED HAND 189–190 (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 
1st ed. 1952). 
 277. Id. at 190. 
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But, Traynor countered: 
Is it not precisely because it lies there that it has declared itself in a 
constitution to be invoked by the courts insistently, unfailingly, against those 
in power, in legislatures or out of them? . . . The judges whose job it is to 
apply [the Constitution] must carry liberty in their hearts even when other 
men have ceased to.”278 
C. JUSTICE TRAYNOR’S REJECTION OF THE “MAGIC WORDS” OF LEGAL 
PROCESS JURISPRUDENCE 
Law and Social Change appears to have been addressed to judges and 
lawyers, and to academics who might offer substantive suggestions to courts to 
improve areas of law in which they specialized. It shows no real concern with 
academic writing on the subject of judicial lawmaking. Traynor’s focus changed 
in his 1961 No Magic Words Can Do It Justice,279 which was written in response 
to the now-famous 1959 articles by two iconic legal process scholars: Herbert 
Wechsler’s Neutral Principles,280 and Henry Hart’s The Time Chart articles.281 
An examination of Magic Words thus offers the best way to understand 
Traynor’s relationship to legal process jurisprudence. Here, Traynor’s focus was 
legal scholarship on the subject of judicial lawmaking—and not just the articles 
by Hart and Wechsler, but also articles by two of their (and Traynor’s) 
contemporaries, Thurman Arnold,282 and Kenneth Culp Davis,283 plus an article 
by Kenneth Karst,284 a member of a younger generation and, indeed, a former 
student of Hart’s. 
Traynor can be seen as dividing this scholarship into two camps. The first, 
consisting of Arnold, Davis, and Karst, recognized that courts are lawmakers, 
encouraged them to be more active on this front, and suggested ways of 
improving the process of judicial lawmaking. The second camp, consisting of 
Hart and Wechsler, wrung their hands over judicial lawmaking and questioned 
rulings of the United States Supreme Court, including Brown v. Board of 
Education in Wechlser’s case. More generally, these scholars sought to impose 
limitations on judicial lawmaking, such as an insistence that lawmaking must 
satisfy criteria such as being be based on “neutral principles.” 
Traynor quickly signaled which camp he sympathized with by beginning 
his analysis with the assertion that there had “been too much idle disputation” 
over whether the judiciary or the legislature “is the primary or ultimate . . . or 
most appropriate[] . . . source of law . . . .”285 This question, of course, was a 
 
 278. Traynor, supra note 18, at 241. 
 279. Traynor, supra note 19. 
 280. Wechsler, supra note 19. 
 281. Hart, Jr., supra note 19. 
 282. Thurman Arnold, Professor Hart’s Theology, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1298 (1960). 
 283. Kenneth Culp Davis, The Future of Judge-Made Public Law in England: A Problem of Practical 
Jurisprudence, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 201 (1961). 
 284. Kenneth L. Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litigation, 1960 SUP. CT. REV. 75 (1960). 
 285. Traynor, supra note 19, at 616. 
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central concern of the legal process scholars. In contrast, Traynor was scornful 
of those who were “wont to view with alarm any judicial lawmaking, such as 
has gone on for centuries, as an encroachment on the legislative function” and 
whose “curious reasoning” asserted that “judicial lawmaking must now atrophy 
because statutory lawmaking is growing apace.”286 
To drive home this view, Traynor next focused on what American courts 
should not do, drawing on Davis’s examination of the state of judicial 
lawmaking in England. “The prevailing belief,” Davis had written, was “that the 
task of judges is limited to the application of previously existing law, and does 
not extend either to a reexamination of case law with a view to improving it or 
to the making of policy choices in giving meaning to silent or unclear 
statutes.”287 Taking issue with Lord Justice Devlin and Sir Arthur Goodhart, two 
prominent English authorities, Davis had bemoaned this “counterrevolution 
against all that was accomplished” by the great Lord Mansfield, the renowned 
Eighteenth century English judge who modernized that country’s commercial 
law.288 At least, Traynor wrote, we in America have moved beyond this “‘law-
is-law’ formalism.” But in Traynor’s view, not far enough.289 
Judges, Traynor wrote, have “the major responsibility for lawmaking in the 
basic common-law subjects.”290 As to the idea that overhauls in the common law 
should be left to the legislature, he insisted that courts “[o]ften . . . have no 
choice but to undertake [this lawmaking] . . . in view of legislative indifference 
or . . . legislative involvement in investigation and lawmaking on other 
fronts.”291 Indeed, courts should undertake this task, in part because of 
“legislative sensitivity to political considerations . . . . [The] very situation [of 
the legislature] compels expedient compromises that have a way of showing [up] 
even in laws that are euphemistically labelled as model.”292 So much for the 
idealized legislative process of the legal process scholars. 
But what of the fear that overly zealous judicial lawmaking requires the 
articulation of limits, lest courts stray into territory best left to the legislature? 
For Traynor, this specter raised the “riddle [of] . . . what should be the outer 
limits of judicial lawmaking, whether with regard to constitutional questions, 
statutory interpretation, or the traditional common-law subjects.”293 Traynor 
wrote that if we can agree that judicial lawmaking “should not shrink too much, 
as it is apparently doing in England, and that it should not stretch too much, as 
it seems far from doing anywhere, how should we establish its appropriate 
range?”294  
 
 286. Id. 
 287. Davis, supra note 283, at 202. 
 288. Id. at 213. 
 289. Traynor, supra note 19, at 617 (quoting Davis, supra note 283, at 213). 
 290. Id. at 618. 
 291. Id. 
 292. Id. 
 293. Id. at 620. 
 294. Id. 
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Since judicial lawmaking was far from stretching too much, it followed 
that expending scholarly energy to develop formulas to limit that lawmaking 
resulted only in the sort of “idle disputation”295 that Traynor deplored. It was 
idle disputation because “[a]fter some twenty years on the bench, [Traynor had 
found] . . . little ground for worry that judges . . . will become zealous to reach 
out for more responsibility than they now have.”296 This is because “[j]udicial 
office has way of deepening caution, not diminishing it.”297 In Traynor’s view, 
the “danger is not that [judges] . . . will exceed their power, but that they will 
fall short of their obligation.”298 
Too many courts, in fact, had fallen short of this obligation. The real 
danger, Traynor wrote, was “not that judges might take off onward and upward, 
but that all too many of them have long since stopped dead in 
[their] . . . tracks.”299 These judges spoke in “the appealing language of stability 
in justification of specious formulas.”300 These formulas, Traynor wrote, were 
nothing more than “a cover . . . for the sin the Bible calls sloth and associates 
with ignorance.”301 
In a transition fraught with implications about his view of legal process 
scholarship, Traynor then turned his attention to the “Magic Words” of his title. 
Traynor first wrote that the “age-old search for magic words becomes 
increasingly desperate, particularly among students at examination time who 
search for them in anguish among the mounting stacks . . . .”302 With no 
intervening text, Traynor then wrote that “[m]odern equivalents decorate the law 
journals, such as Professor Herbert Wechsler’s ‘neutral principles.’”303 Traynor 
seems to invite the reader to view Wechsler as the adult equivalent of a desperate 
law student at examination time, hopelessly searching among the stacks for 
magic words. 
In his Neutral Principles article, Wechsler had demanded that in deciding 
on the constitutionality of legislation, courts issue “principled decision[s],” 
decisions “that rest[] on reasons . . . that in their generality and their neutrality 
transcend any immediate result that is involved.”304 Where no such reasons “can 
be assigned for overturning value choices of the other branches . . . those choices 
must [stand].”305 So could an opinion based on neutral principles be written to 
strike down the school segregation legislation involved in Brown v. Board of 
Education? Wechsler wrote—five years after Brown—“I should like to think 
 
 295. Id. at 616. 
 296. Id. at 620. 
 297. Id. 
 298. Id. 
 299. Id. at 621. 
 300. Id. 
 301. Id. 
 302. Id. at 623. 
 303. Id. 
 304. Wechsler, supra note 19, at 19.  
 305. Id. 
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[so] . . . but I confess that I have not yet written the opinion.”306 This stands in 
stark contrast to what Traynor had written three years prior to Neutral 
Principles. In Law and Social Change, Traynor had written that it had “long 
been accepted” that discriminatory state action such as school segregation laws 
“must yield to the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment.”307 Indeed, Traynor wrote, “It is 
now widely, if not universally, accepted that there is no rational basis” for the 
“insidiously evil thing” that is “any law for race discrimination.”308 
In Magic Words, Traynor wrote, “What Professor Wechsler wants, as most 
of us do, is a principled decision ‘that rests on reasons with respect to all the 
issues in the case, reasons that in their generality and their neutrality transcend 
any immediate result that is involved.’”309 As thus stated, “[n]eutral principles 
sound pure and simple.”310 However, for Traynor, that is not a virtue but a vice 
because “a judge . . . confronts problems ridden with impurities and 
complications.”311 And thus, Traynor asked, “What did Professor Wechsler have 
in mind beyond magic words?”312 
Traynor proposed two answers to this question, each suggesting that 
Wechsler’s quest for neutral principles was a bunch of academic nonsense. First, 
Traynor asked, “Is [Wechsler’s] . . . vision of sweet reasonableness a pictorial 
one, in which judges make deft transitions from the past through the instant case 
to the future perfect along the curvy, narrow path that artful or clumsy 
adversaries trace out in a bog of facts?”313 Or, in the alternative, “[i]s it an 
abstraction of embryonic syllogisms about adversary values that swirl in the 
judicial mind until at last, all values have disappeared but one contained within 
the luminous logic that lawyers and judges describe as inescapable when at last, 
it no longer escapes them?”314 Obviously, neither of these suggestions were 
meant to be taken seriously. And, in this vein, Traynor wrote that “[t]wo scholars 
 
 306. Id. at 34. 
 307. Traynor, supra note 18, at 237. 
 308. Id. 
 309. Traynor, supra note 19, at 623–24 (quoting Wechsler, supra note 19, at 19). 
 310. Id. at 624. 
 311. Id. 
 312. Id. 
 313. Id. 
 314. Id.  
Judges must somehow walk out of themselves into thin air and record a distilled impersonal judgment yet 
stay close enough to common people to gain their acceptance and hence its own durability.  
. . . .  
The composite ideal of the professors, if I abstract it aright, is a judge who, after marshalling an 
impressive array of relevant facts, can write an opinion that gives promise of more than a three-year lease 
on life by accurately anticipating the near future, who respects established folk patterns by not anticipating 
the too distant future, and who walks a tightrope of logic to the satisfaction of a team of collective thinkers 
as well as to the plaudits of the philosophers. 
Id. at 624–25. 
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roundly declare that the proposed standard for judicial review is an illusion, 
cruelly adding that ‘it merely restates the question.’”315 
Traynor’s dissatisfaction with Wechsler’s search for magic words was 
matched by his impatience with Henry Hart’s Time Chart of the Justices.316 Hart, 
Traynor wrote, was “disturbed to find upon painstaking analysis that Supreme 
Court opinions fall short of optimum workmanship and that too often a case falls 
into the limbo of a per curiam decision.”317 Hart “charitably [laid] some blame 
[on] . . . ‘The Time Chart of the Justices.’”318 His remedy thus “call[ed] for an 
easier schedule that would promote the articulation of what he calls ‘impersonal 
and durable principles.’”319 
Once again, Traynor seems to have viewed this as academic nonsense, 
writing that “Thurman Arnold storms at what he called ‘Professor Hart’s 
Theology,’ gleefully chewing up such phrases as ‘fully focused and functioning 
intellectual effort’ and deriding as unrealistic any vision of pearly unanimous 
decisions that purportedly would emerge from the ‘maturing of collective 
thought.’”320 Arnold had “[d]eplor[ed] uniformity as unbefitting times of 
revolutionary change, [and had] . . . unkindly suggest[ed] that it might 
lamentably ensue ‘if the Supreme Court were selected from a single law school 
whose faculty was recruited from like-minded dialecticians.’”321 Reinforcing 
Arnold’s point, Traynor observed that “[a] mere judge listening in on such 
persuasive adversaries is bound to speculate on how collective thought about 
neutral principles would mature were they ever to be brothers on the bench.”322 
Traynor’s fundamental objection to what he called the “academic 
tintinnabulation of enduring principles”323 was not only that such a 
preoccupation would stifle needed judicial creativity, but that it did nothing to 
improve the substance or process of judicial lawmaking. On the substantive 
front, Traynor wrote that “[j]udges hospitable to the idea of being reasonable 
would welcome also some usable standards.”324 Wechsler (and Hart), however, 
had “ignored the abundant opportunities available to a scholar with hindsight to 
compose a symphony of neutral principles that would improve on [judicial 
efforts that lack] . . . adequate transcendental shine.”325 Thus, the judge “is 
usually the gem-cutter of enduring principles by default.”326 Such principles will 
seldom be found in briefs submitted by “lawyers [who] rarely make their fees 
 
 315. Id. at 624 (quoting Arthur S. Miller & Ronald F. Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional 
Adjudication, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 661, 663 (1960)). 
 316. Hart, Jr., supra note 19. 
 317. Traynor, supra note 19, at 624. 
 318. Id. (quoting Hart, Jr., supra note 19). 
 319. Id. (quoting Hart, Jr., supra note 19, at 99). 
 320. Id. at 624–25 (footnote omitted) (quoting Arnold, supra note 282, at 1313). 
 321. Id. at 625 (quoting Arnold, supra note 282, at 1313). 
 322. Id. 
 323. Id. at 627. 
 324. Id. at 624. 
 325. Id. 
 326. Id. at 625. 
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contingent upon finding them . . . .”327 Moreover, “they are not always to be 
found in textbooks, for the scholars who long for them are under no urgency to 
declare what they are.”328 
Moving beyond the quest for the “ideal decision,” Traynor wrote that he, 
and other judges, were “sharply aware of how much need there is to improve the 
effectiveness of the judicial process.”329 And here, Traynor reported that there 
had been useful scholarly work, much of it pioneered by Kenneth Culp Davis. 
An example, Traynor wrote, was the work of Kenneth Karst, who had “advanced 
beyond the academic tintinnabulation of enduring principles to the concrete 
suggestion that . . . courts must sometimes ‘be informed on matters far beyond 
the facts of the particular case.’”330 An examination of a pair of Supreme Court 
decisions had led Karst to conclude that greater consensus might emerge on the 
court by “intensifying [the] . . . examination of data surrounding a controversy 
that may be essential to its understanding.”331 
To resolve a hard case, Traynor wrote, why should courts “not 
inquire . . . into what Professor Kenneth Davis calls ‘legislative facts,’ or what 
we might call the environmental data, as distinguished from . . . litigated facts 
presented to the court.”332 And, Traynor asked rhetorically, “When hard cases 
make good law, is it not usually because the judges had before them the data 
requisite for an informed judgment?”333 Of course, “only a small fraction of 
cases are of a complexity that calls for inquiry beyond the facts about the parties 
and available precedents,” but these cases “may be of major significance in the 
development of the law.”334 
Traynor’s message, in a nutshell, was that there had “been too much idle 
disputation” over whether the courts or legislatures are “the primary or 
ultimate . . . or most appropriate[] . . . source of law.”335 Legal scholars should 
turn away from the “academic tintinnabulation of enduring principles.”336 
Instead, they should focus, as Harper and James had done, on “[t]he demolition 
of obsolete theories,” in order to “break ground for new paths,”337 and, when 
necessary, follow Davis’s advice to “inquire . . . [into] ‘legislative facts’” to 
inform their lawmaking.338 
 
 327. Id. 
 328. Id. 
 329. Id. 
 330. Id. at 627 (quoting Karst, supra note 284, at 77). 
 331. Id. at 626. 
 332. Id. at 627 (citing KENNETH C. DAVIS, 2 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 15.03 (1958)). 
 333. Id. 
 334. Id. 
 335. Id. at 616. 
 336. Id. at 627. 
 337. Traynor, supra note 18, at 234. 
 338. Traynor, supra note 19, at 627. 
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For Traynor, the “real concern [was] . . . not the remote possibility of too 
many creative opinions but their continuing scarcity.”339 In his view, the “growth 
of the law, far from being unduly accelerated by judicial boldness, is unduly 
hampered by a judicial lethargy that masks itself as judicial dignity with the tacit 
approval of an equally lethargic bar.”340 “[J]udicial responsibility . . . . [entails] 
the recurring formulation of new rules to supplement or displace the old [and 
the] choice of one policy over another.”341 Thus, Traynor called on courts to 
rewrite the law “to meet new conditions and new moral values,” which he linked 
to the New Deal response to the Great Depression, in a “society given the 
opprobrious term ‘welfare state’ by those who would have it remain static.”342 
In tort law, these were the values expressed in the Harper and James treatise, and 
thus an affront to legal process jurisprudence. 
IV.  ENTERPRISE LIABILITY AND LEGAL PRAGMATISM IN THE CALIFORNIA 
SUPREME COURT 
A. ALTERED NORMS OF JUDICIAL LAWMAKING 
When Justice Traynor was appointed to the California Supreme Court in 
1940, the idea that courts could rewrite the law to reflect the policies and agenda 
of the enterprise liability scholars would have seemed fanciful at best. At the 
time, arguments for the loss distribution policy and the enterprise liability 
agenda would have been seen as not only substantively undesirable, but even 
inappropriate for judicial consideration. They would have been derided as 
“sentimental,” as opposed to “legal justice,” inconsistent with the very concept 
of “a court of law.”343 A quarter century later, legal formalism still exerted its 
hold on many lawyers and judges, buttressed by then with concerns over the lack 
of political accountability of courts and their lack of competence to engage in 
large-scale, policy-based reform of tort law. 
Attitudes toward the possibility that courts might adopt a doctrine of 
comparative negligence illustrate the firm grip that such thinking had in 
mainstream legal thought well into the 1960s.344 The contributory negligence 
doctrine, which was the law in most states, deprived an injured plaintiff of 
recovery from a negligent defendant if the plaintiff also had been negligent. The 
harsh effect of this rule had long been apparent.345 It left the entire loss on an 
 
 339. Roger J. Traynor, Comment, Comment on Courts and Lawmaking, in LEGAL INSTITUTIONS TODAY 
AND TOMORROW: THE CENTENNIAL CONFERENCE VOLUME 48, 52 (Monrad G. Paulsen ed., 1959). 
 340. Id. 
 341. R. J. Traynor, The Courts: Interweavers in the Reformation of Law, 32 SASK. L. REV. 201, 213 (1967). 
 342. Traynor, supra note 18, at 231–32. 
 343. See Seavey, supra note 48, at 373. 
 344. See Ursin, supra note 70, at 238–42. 
 345. See 2 HARPER & JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 61, at 1193–1209, 1236–41; Leon Green, 
Illinois Negligence Law, 39 ILL. L. REV. 36, 36 (1944); Wex S. Malone, The Formative Era of Contributory 
Negligence, 41 ILL. L. REV. 151, 164–77 (1946); A. Chalmers Mole & Lyman P. Wilson, A Study of Comparative 
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injured party, even though he was only slightly negligent, and relieved a 
negligent defendant of liability however much he may have contributed to the 
injury. A rule of comparative negligence, in contrast, would apportion damages 
according to the relative negligence of the two parties. Moreover, where 
insurance is common, as in the case of automobile accidents or accidents 
associated with business enterprises, a rule of comparative negligence would 
better serve the goals of compensating negligently injured persons and widely 
distributing accident losses. 
The prospect of judicial adoption of a comparative negligence rule could, 
however, be seen to raise concerns over the lack of competence and political 
accountability of courts. First, reform would involve more than merely replacing 
contributory negligence with a comparative negligence rule. Adoption of the 
comparative negligence principle would leave numerous unresolved problems, 
including problems concerning set-offs, joint and several liability, and the status 
of doctrines such as last clear chance and assumption of risk.346 Moreover, as 
was observed at the time, because insurance companies would initially bear 
liability costs in the majority of instances, “[j]udicial reform would . . . affect the 
whole complicated—and partly regulated—structure of insurance rates.”347 In 
addition, comparative negligence is precisely the sort of issue that is certain to 
“affect or become involved in current political controversy” and thus beyond the 
reach of judicial action.348 Harry Kalven described the situation in 1968: “[B]ills 
have been introduced without success in many state legislatures. We have then 
a situation in which legislation is possible, and has indeed been tried, but in 
which there is clearly no legislative consensus in favor of the reform.”349 The 
issue of comparative negligence can thus be seen as dragging politics into the 
judicial system by requiring courts to decide the sort of issue that legal process 
writers would eschew. 
Writing from the legal process perspective,350 and reflecting these 
concerns, Paul Mishkin and Clarence Morris wrote in 1965 that it should come 
as no surprise that “there is no substantial likelihood that any court will act 
today . . . to [adopt] . . . comparative negligence.” Mishkin and Morris went 
even further, observing that “lawyers will not even consider arguing this 
possibility to a court.”351 
 
Comparative Negligence and Automobile Liability Insurance, 58 MICH. L. REV. 689, 690 (1953); William L. 
Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MICH. L. REV. 465, 469 (1953). 
 346. Robert A. Leflar, Comment, Comments on Maki v. Frelk—Comparative v. Contributory Negligence: 
Should the Court or Legislature Decide, 21 VAND. L. REV. 918, 920–21 (1968). 
 347. Wolfgang Friedmann, Legal Philosophy and Judicial Lawmaking, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 821, 841 (1961). 
 348. See KEETON, supra note 30, at 92. 
 349. Harry Kalven, Jr., Comment, Comments on Maki v. Frelk–Comparative v. Contributory Negligence: 
Should the Court or Legislature Decide, 21 VAND. L. REV. 897, 899 (1968). 
 350. Mishkin and Morris wrote that their “explicit references to Professors Hart and Sack’s book fall far 
short of how much we learned from them. . . . [H]aving once traveled over much ground with them as guides, 
we can no longer see the landscape free from their influence.” PAUL J. MISHKIN & CLARENCE MORRIS, ON LAW 
IN COURTS: AN INTRODUCTION TO JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT OF CASE AND STATUTE LAW xii (1965). 
 351. Id. at 256. 
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Nevertheless, lawyers in 1968 did ask the Illinois Supreme Court to adopt 
a doctrine of comparative negligence. The court, however, responded in the 
manner predicted by Mishkin and Morris, refusing in Maki v. Frelk to adopt that 
doctrine.352 This refusal was not because the court favored the contributory 
negligence rule on the merits, but because the court believed that such a change 
was not within the appropriate role of the courts: “After full consideration we 
think . . . that such a far-reaching change, if desirable, should be made by the 
legislature rather than by the court.”353 The court’s reasons echoed the concerns 
of the legal process writers over political accountability and competence. The 
court wrote, “The General Assembly is the department of government to which 
the constitution has entrusted the power of changing the laws.”354 Because it 
found contributory negligence mentioned in several legislative enactments, the 
court concluded that “the legislative branch is manifestly in a better position than 
is this court to consider the numerous problems involved.”355 
Maki might suggest that the legal process thinking had a firm hold on the 
American judiciary; indeed, scholars saw the Maki result as no surprise. As 
Kalven wrote:  
[N]o technological or sociological change . . . made the doctrine now look 
different than it had in prior years . . . . [N]othing was producing any new 
insight about the rule nor was there any new reason for changing it that had 
not been fully evident to all those courts which for all those years had refused 
to make the change.356  
And as late as 1971, William Prosser concluded that there was little likelihood 
of judicial adoption of comparative negligence.357 
Kalven may have been correct that there had been no technological or 
sociological change or new insight about the rule that “had not been fully evident 
to all those courts which for all those years had refused to make the change.”358 
Overlooked by Kalven, however, was the fact that there had been a 
jurisprudential change. 
Judge Posner writes that the accepted norms of judging are an important 
influence on judges. He suggests that “the biggest internal constraints 
on . . . judging,” typically are “the desire for self-respect and for respect from 
other judges and legal professionals generally, which a judge earns by being a 
good judge.”359 Most judges “derive considerable intrinsic satisfaction from 
 
 352. Maki v. Frelk, 239 N.E. 2d 445, 447 (1968). 
 353. Id. 
 354. Id. 
 355. Id. at 448. 
 356. Kalven, supra note 349, at 898–99 (footnote omitted). 
 357. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 67, at 435 (4th ed. 1971). Prosser’s 1971 
prognosis was based in part on the fact that most state legislatures at that date had refused to adopt comparative 
negligence. Id. A surge of legislative adoptions occurred during and after the late 1960’s. See John G. Fleming, 
The Supreme Court of California 1974–1975—Foreword: Comparative Negligence at Last—By Judicial 
Choice, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 239, 239–40 (1976). 
 358. Kalven, supra note 349, at 898. 
 359. POSNER, supra note 13, at 371. 
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their work and want to be able to regard themselves and be regarded by others 
as good judges.”360 And to be regarded “as a good judge requires conformity to 
the accepted norms of judging.”361 
The Maki decision and the assessments by Kalven and Prosser no doubt 
accurately reflected the norms of judging that dominated the first six decades of 
the twentieth century. But something jurisprudential had changed, although 
mainstream scholars—comfortable in their legal process assumptions—failed to 
recognize that change: the California Supreme Court, led by Justice Traynor, 
was marching to a different drummer. 
Posner also writes that, in judging, “norms are contestable,”362 and “[r]apid 
norm shifts are possible . . . because the products of th[is] activit[y] cannot be 
evaluated objectively.”363 In law it is the “innovative judges [who] challenge the 
accepted standards of their art . . . . [And these] innovators have the greater 
influence on the evolution of their field.”364 Posner cites Holmes, Brandeis, 
Cardozo, and Hand as “examples of judges who succeeded by their example in 
altering the norms of opinion writing.”365 
Just that had happened in California. Led by Justice Traynor’s example and 
extrajudicial writings, by the early 1960s, the California Supreme Court had 
returned to the pragmatic jurisprudence of Holmes, Cardozo, and the Legal 
Realists—and many other state supreme courts soon would follow. In fact, two 
years after Prosser’s prognosis, the Florida Supreme Court instituted 
comparative negligence,366 and was quickly followed by the supreme courts of 
California and Alaska367—and then eventually by the Illinois Supreme Court 
itself.368 
B. THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT: THE LIBERAL ERA (1960–1985) 
Beginning in the 1960s, the California Supreme Court left legal formalism 
and legal process jurisprudence in the rearview mirror as it embraced the 
jurisprudence of legal pragmatism and the agenda of the enterprise liability 
scholars.369 Under Traynor’s guidance, the California Supreme Court became an 
occasional—and in some fields frequent—legislator, with policy at the heart of 
its lawmaking. By the 1970s, Grant Gilmore wrote, the court had become “the 
 
 360. Id. at 62 (footnote omitted). 
 361. Id. at 61. 
 362. Id. at 63. 
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 365. Id. at 63. 
 366. Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So.2d 431, 436–37 (Fla. 1973). 
 367. See Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037, 1049 (Alaska 1975); Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226, 1242 
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 368. See Alvis v. Ribar, 421 N.E.2d 886, 897 (Ill. 1981). 
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P.2d 1, 4 (Cal. 1948) (shifting burden of proof in cause in fact); and 1950s; De Burgh v. De Burgh, 250 P.2d 
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the nation’s first non-fault divorce law); see also infra notes 259–262 and accompanying text). 
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most innovative court in the country.”370 The consequence of that innovation 
was, as the editors of the Harvard Law Review reported in 1970, a “dramatic 
renaissance of the common law,”371 most notably in tort law. 
The strict liability doctrine and its underlying policies were written into 
California law in the 1960s and 1970s. In its unanimous 1963 decision in 
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,372 the court, in an opinion written by 
Justice Traynor, adopted the doctrine of strict tort liability of manufacturers for 
defective products. Then, guided by the policies of loss spreading and the 
creation of incentives for safety, the Court rapidly extended strict liability 
beyond manufacturers to include retailers,373 wholesalers,374 and lessors.375 
These rulings, which were quickly followed by courts across the nation, 
represented “the most rapid and altogether spectacular overturn of an established 
rule in the entire history of the law of torts.”376 
The agenda of the enterprise liability scholars met with similar success 
within negligence law.377 In 1968, for example, the California Supreme Court, 
in its landmark decision in Rowland v. Christian, wrote policy factors that can 
be traced to Leon Green into California tort law as it discarded the traditional 
landowner rules and replaced them with a general duty of due care.378  
In deciding whether to retain, discard, or modify traditional no-duty rules 
in the future, the court would consider: 
[T]he foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the 
plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the 
defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the 
defendant’s conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the 
burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a 
duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, 
cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.379 
 
 370. GILMORE, supra note 2, at 91. 
 371. Editors’ Dedication, supra note 6, at 1769. 
 372. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 900–01 (Cal. 1963); Ursin, Great Judges, 
supra note 16, at 1336. 
 373. See Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 391 P.2d 168, 171–72 (Cal. 1964). 
 374. See Canifax v. Hercules Powder Co., 46 Cal. Rptr. 552, 557 (Cal. Ct. App. 1965). 
 375. See Price v. Shell Oil Co., 466 P.2d 722, 723, 726–27 (Cal. 1970). 
 376. PROSSER, supra note 357, § 97, at 654. 
 377. See Ursin, supra note 16, at 1337. 
 378. Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 564, 567 (Cal. 1968). Rowland adopted and augmented factors 
first articulated by the court in Biakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16, 19 (Cal. 1958). Biakanja, in turn, drew on and 
augmented factors found in Prosser’s hornbook, see PROSSER, supra note 357, § 30, at 164–68, and the Harper 
and James treatise, see 2 HARPER & JAMES, JR., supra note 61, § 18.6, at 1052. Prosser’s factors were an 
adaptation of the duty factors Green had articulated in his Duty Problem articles. See Edmund Ursin, The Missing 
Normative Dimension in Brian Leiter’s “Reconstructed” Legal Realism, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 14, 34 n.280 
(2012). Rowland’s duty factors would provide the framework for California decisions expanding the concept of 
duty in later years, and with a more conservative court in the past quarter century, they also provided the 
framework for cutting back liability. Compare Isaacs v. Huntington Mem’l Hosp., 695 P.2d 653, 658–59, 661–
63 (Cal. 1985) (emphasizing foreseeability and expanding landowner duty to protect against crime by third 
parties), with Ann M. v. Pac. Plaza Shopping Ctr., 863 P.2d 207, 214–15 (Cal. 1993) (limiting Isaacs). 
 379. Rowland, 443 P.2d at 564. 
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The “fundamental principle,” the court wrote, is that liability generally 
should be imposed “for an injury occasioned to another by [a] . . . want of 
ordinary care or skill.”380 
As with its landmark strict products liability rulings, the California 
Supreme Court’s approach to duty has proved influential with the nation’s 
courts, as illustrated by the Restatement (Third) of Torts.381 Like California, the 
Third Restatement embraces a default rule that defendants owe a duty of 
reasonable care to avoid physical injury.382 Also, like California, the decision 
that a no-duty rule should be adopted is a determination of policy. In the words 
of the Third Restatement, “[a] principle or policy [which] warrants denying or 
limiting liability.”383 About half of the nation’s courts have followed Rowland 
in establishing a unitary standard of care in premises cases, at least with respect 
to invitees and licensees.384 Moreover, the Third Restatement would adopt a 
unitary standard of care for all persons injured on a defendant’s premises, except 
for “flagrant trespassers.”385 
C. THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT: THE CONSERVATIVE ERA (1986–
2019) 
As a consequence of judicial appointments by Republican governors in the 
mid-1980s, the California Supreme Court became a conservative court. Yet the 
jurisprudence of this court remained that of its predecessor. It also was an 
avowedly lawmaking court, with (conservative) policies at the heart of its 
lawmaking. This court refined or cut back on—but in most cases did not 
abandon386—the enterprise liability doctrines put in place by its predecessor, 
while at times adopting new policy-based doctrines limiting defendant 
liability.387 
 
 380. Id. at 563–64. 
 381. 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 7 (AM. LAW INST. 
2005).  
 382. Id. 
 383. Id. at 77. 
 384. See W. Jonathan Cardi & Michael D. Green, Duty Wars, 81 S. CALIF. L. REV. 671, 676 n.27 (2008) 
(citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS; LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 51 reporters’ note 
to cmt. a (Council Draft No. 7, 2007)). 
 385. See 2 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS §§ 51–52 (AM. LAW INST. 2012). This exception can also be 
seen to resemble California law. Following Rowland, the California legislature enacted a limited number of 
exceptions to Rowland’s general duty of care, most notably for persons committing one or more enumerated 
felonies. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 847 (West 2020). 
 386. But see Becker v. IRM Corp., 698 P.2d 116, 124 (Cal. 1985). 
 387. See, e.g., Ann M. v. Pac. Plaza Shopping Ctr., 863 P.2d 207, 215–16 (Cal. 1993) (limiting duty of 
business premises owner to protect persons against violent third-party crime); Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 
712 (Cal. 1992) (abolishing traditional consent-based defense of assumption of risk and establishing a new no-
duty rule for co-participants in recreational sports); Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 815 (Cal. 1989) (restricting 
recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress). In 1999, Stephen Sugarman described the shift in the 
court’s posture in the post-1986 era by examining decisions for the fifteen years between 1984 and 1998. See 
Stephen D. Sugarman, Judges as Tort Law Un-Makers: Recent California Experience with “New” Torts, 49 
DEPAUL L. REV. 455, 456 (1999). 
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An example of the conservative court creating a new policy-based no-duty 
rule is provided by the court’s decisions involving participants and others 
involved in sporting activities.388 In 1975, five years after Traynor’s retirement, 
the still-liberal California Supreme Court, in Li v. Yellow Cab Co. of California, 
abolished the doctrine of contributory negligence and adopted a system of pure 
comparative negligence.389 After Li, plaintiff negligence would no longer 
completely bar recovery in negligence suits; rather, damages would only be 
“diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the person 
recovering.”390 
Li also had a second holding, this one involving the doctrine of assumption 
of risk. Prior to Li, a person who voluntarily encountered a specific known and 
appreciated risk (whether reasonably or unreasonably) would not recover when 
injured by a negligent defendant.391 Li held that the assumption of risk defense 
is merged into the general scheme of assessment of liability in proportion to fault 
in instances in which the plaintiff unreasonably encountered a specific known 
risk created by a defendant’s negligence.392 Thus, it appeared, counterintuitively, 
that a non-negligent plaintiff might still be totally barred from recovery. 
In his 1992 plurality opinion in Knight v. Jewett, which he later reaffirmed 
in a majority opinion for the court,393 Justice Ronald George, who later became 
the court’s Chief Justice, effectively abolished the traditional defense of 
assumption of risk.394 In doing so, he also created a new policy-based limited 
duty doctrine favorable to defendants who are participants in sports. As his later 
majority opinion explained, to “impose liability on a coparticipant for ‘normal 
energetic conduct’ while playing—even careless conduct—could chill vigorous 
participation in the sport” and could “alter fundamentally the nature of the sport 
by deterring participants from vigorously engaging in activity.”395 As “a matter 
of policy, it would not be appropriate to recognize a duty of care when to do so 
would require that an integral part of the sport be abandoned, or would 
discourage vigorous participation in sporting events.”396 Accordingly, the court 
held that “a participant breaches a duty of care to a co-participant only if he or 
she ‘intentionally injures another player or engages in conduct that is so reckless 
as to be totally outside the range of the ordinary activity involved in the 
 
 388. See Edmund Ursin, The California Supreme Court and Judicial Lawmaking—The Jurisprudence of the 
California Supreme Court, 9 CAL. LEGAL HIST. 383, 387–88 (2014). 
 389. Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226, 1243 (Cal. 1975); Ursin, supra note 70, at 254–59. 
 390. Li, 532 P.2d at 1243. 
 391. Id. at 1240. 
 392. Id. at 1240–41. 
 393. Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 697 (Cal. 1992). The views expressed in George’s plurality Knight 
opinion were subsequently embraced by a majority of the court. See Kahn v. East Side Union High School 
District, 75 P.3d 30, 38 (Cal. 2003). 
 394. Knight, 834 P.2d at 714 (Kennard, J., dissenting). To maintain continuity with its Li decision, however, 
the Knight court retained the terminology of assumption of the risk. See Edmund Ursin & John N. Carter, 
Clarifying Duty: California’s No-Duty-for-Sports Regime, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 383, 390–91 (2008). 
 395. Kahn, 75 P.3d at 38 (citation omitted) (quoting Knight, 834 P.2d at 710). 
 396. Id. 
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sport.’”397 Just as Greenman led to extensions of strict products liability beyond 
manufacturers, so Knight launched extensions of its no-duty rule beyond 
participants and sports.398 
POSTSCRIPT 
In 2011, California Governor Jerry Brown took office and would serve 
until 2019. During his tenure, Brown, a Democrat, made four appointments to 
the California Supreme Court, with the last appointee joining the court in 2019. 
Thus, today we have a “third iteration” of the court. The seven-member court 
consists of the four Brown appointees and three justices appointed by 
Republican governors. There is every reason to believe that the jurisprudence of 
the “Brown Court” will remain that of legal pragmatism. Evidence of this can 
be seen in Kesner v. Superior Court, a 2016 decision of a unanimous court 
consisting of three Brown appointees and four justices appointed by Republican 
governors.399 The court’s opinion in Kesner was written by Justice Goodwin Liu, 
a Brown appointee. 
Kesner involved two cases alleging wrongful death and personal injury, 
with the court holding that employers and premises owners who use asbestos on 
their property owe members of a worker’s household a duty of care to prevent 
secondary exposure to asbestos caused when a worker who is directly exposed 
to the toxin carries it home on his or her person or clothing.400  
The court’s opinion offered an insightful analysis and application of the 
Rowland factors. First, the court noted that the factors could be placed in two 
categories: foreseeability and public policy concerns.401 The first “[t]hree 
factors—foreseeability, certainty, and connection between the plaintiff and the 
defendant—address the foreseeability of the relevant injury.”402 The last four 
factors, “moral blame, preventing future harm, burden, and availability of 
insurance . . . take into account public policy concerns that might support 
excluding certain kinds of plaintiffs or injuries from relief.”403  
As in past cases, the court noted that “[t]he most important factor to 
consider in determining whether to create an exception to the general duty to 
exercise ordinary care . . . is whether the injury in question 
[is] . . . foreseeable.”404 The court concluded that this factor was met.405 In a 
helpful observation, the court wrote that “the second Rowland factor, the degree 
 
 397. Id. at 32 (quoting Knight, 834 P.2d at 711). 
 398. See e.g., Kahn, 75 P.3d at 32 (expanding tort law to also include the relationship of coaches and 
players); see also Gregory v. Cott, 331 P.3d 179, 181 (Cal. 2014) (expanding the rule to apply to in-home 
caregivers of Alzheimer’s patients). 
 399. Kesner v. Superior Court, 384 P.3d 283 (Cal. 2016). 
 400. Id. at 305. 
 401. Id. at 291. 
 402. Id.  
 403. Id. 
 404. Id. 
 405. Id. 
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of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, ‘has been noted primarily, if not 
exclusively, when the only claimed injury is an intangible harm such as 
emotional distress.’”406 In any event, the court concluded that the deaths in these 
cases were “certain and compensable under the law.”407 As to “the third Rowland 
factor, ‘the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct and the 
injury suffered,’” the court wrote that this factor “is strongly related to the 
question of foreseeability.”408 Again, this factor was met.409 
As to the public policy concerns, the court wrote that “[n]egligence in [the] 
use of asbestos is morally blameworthy . . . .”410 Regarding the burden factor, 
the defendants had argued that “[a]llowing tort liability for take-home asbestos 
exposure would dramatically increase the volume of asbestos litigation . . . and 
create enormous costs for the courts and community.”411 The court pointed out, 
however, that “the relevant burden in the analysis of duty is not the cost of 
compensating individuals for past negligence. . . . Rather, . . . duty analysis is 
forward-looking, and the most relevant burden is the cost to the defendants of 
upholding, not violating, the duty of ordinary care.”412 In this regard, defendants 
did not “suggest that preventing . . . exposure to asbestos [would have 
been] . . . unreasonably expensive to defendants . . . .”413 
“Defendants [had] further argue[d] that a finding of duty here 
[would] . . . result in increased insurance costs and tort damages, and ultimately 
impose a burden on consumers and the community.”414 Quoting Justice 
Traynor’s Escola concurring opinion, the court countered that “the tort system 
contemplates that the cost of an injury, instead of amounting to a ‘needless’ and 
‘overwhelming misfortune to the person injured’ will instead ‘be insured by the 
[defendant] and distributed among the public as a cost of doing business.’”415 
Then, turning to the policy of preventing future harms, the court wrote that the 
allocation of the cost of injuries contemplated by Escola “serves to ensure that 
those ‘best situated’ to prevent such injuries are incentivized to do so.”416 In this 
regard, “[e]mployers and premises owners are generally better positioned than 
their employees or members of their employees’ households to know of the 
dangers of asbestos and its transmission pathways, and to take reasonable 
precautions to avoid injuries that may result from on-site and take-home 
 
 406. Id. at 293 (quoting Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 777 (Cal. 1992) (Kennard, J., 
dissenting)).  
 407. Id. 
 408. Id. (quoting Cabral v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 248 P.3d 1170, 1174 (Cal. 2011)). 
 409. Id. at 294. 
 410. Id. at 296. 
 411. Id. 
 412. Id.   
 413. Id. at 297. 
 414. Id.  
 415. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1944) 
(Traynor, J., concurring)). 
 416. Id. (quoting Escola, 150 P.2d at 441 (Traynor, J., concurring)). 
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exposure.”417 Finally, the court wrote that the “[d]efendants’ most forceful 
contention is that a finding of duty in these cases would open the door to an 
‘enormous pool of potential plaintiffs.’”418 The court disagreed, holding that the 
“duty to prevent take-home exposure extends only to members of a worker’s 
household.”419 
Thus, for more than six decades, the California Supreme Court has been a 
lawmaking court with policy at the heart of its decisionmaking. Whether 
adopting expansive enterprise liability doctrines in the liberal era or reining in 
those doctrines and adopting new restrictive doctrines in the conservative era, 
its jurisprudence has been that of legal pragmatism. Kesner suggests that legal 
pragmatism will remain the jurisprudence of the California Supreme Court for 
the foreseeable future. 
 
 
 417. Id. 
 418. Id. 
 419. Id. at 298. 
